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The theoretical and empirical literature on the macroeconomic effects of capital inflows 
posits that a net inflow of foreign capital leads to an equilibrium real exchange rate (RER) 
appreciation through an expansion in aggregate demand. But this literature fails to 
distinguish between the different types of flows, or their specific mechanisms of influence. 
This paper analyses the adjustment process to FDI inflows in the case of Costa Rica, and 
focuses on whether, to what extent and through what mechanisms such adjustment requires a 
RER appreciation. It argues that a study of the process of macroeconomic adjustment to a net 
inflow of FDI –the transfer process- should not be detached from an investigation into the 
trade and financial practices of the foreign-owned firms towards which FDI flows. A two-
sector model is developed to capture the basic interactions between foreign investment, 
domestic investment and the RER. It shows that the sectoral allocation of FDI, the response of 
domestic investment to exogenous changes in the foreign capital stock, the input composition 
of foreign capital, and the financial practices of foreign investors, are crucial determinants of 
the long-run equilibrium RER. The paper also includes two empirical parts.  The first one 
provides an overview of the general trends of aggregate FDI inflows into Costa Rica between 
1970-99, and analyses some data on the trade and financial patterns of foreign affiliates 
operating in the country. The second undertakes an econometric examination of the impact of 
FDI on output, investment, exports, imports and the RER, using cointegration techniques. The 
study is based on annual data for the period 1970-99. It is found that FDI exerts a strong 
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I.  Introduction 
 
The study of the economic impact of foreign direct investment (FDI) on the recipient 
country has been shaped by diverging theoretical approaches, depending on whether 
the subject of analysis is the multinational company (MNC) and its foreign affiliates, 
or FDI as a category within the balance of p ayments. When the focus is on 
employment, technology transfer, competition, or taxation, researchers tend to 
concentrate on the MNC and on specific microeconomic channels of transmission: 
technology and human capital spillovers, economies of scale and agglomeration, 
industrial structure, foreign market access. FDI is thus regarded as a bundle of capital, 
technology and skills.
2 By contrast, the open-economy macroeconomics literature 
tends to merge FDI with other components of the capital account, in order to explore 
their effects on aggregate spending. FDI is then treated as an unembodied or 
unattached financial flow.
3 The divorce of the two strands is particularly apparent in 
the standard analysis of the macroeconomic adjustment to FDI and other capital 
inflows, a subject of much current attention.   
 
After a decade of limited access to international financial markets, many Asian and 
Latin American countries experienced a resurgence of inward foreign capital in the 
1990s. While the theoretical benefits for d eveloping economies of increased 
international financial integration have been acknowledged,
4 particular concern in 
economic research has turned on the macroeconomic problems associated with large 
capital inflows: excessive current account deficits, overheating, real exchange rate 
(RER) appreciation.
5 From a static, balance-of-payments accounting perspective, net 
resource transfers must be translated –for a given level of international reserves- into 
an increased trade deficit (or a reduced trade surplus). But a crucial question is how 
this transfer process is effected; i.e. what is the set of economic adjustment 
mechanisms through which a net capital transfer is reflected in the trade balance. The 
standard theoretical explanation, based on the Salter-Swan-Corden dependent 
economy framework, is that a surge in capital inflows will trigger an expansion in 
aggregate demand, which –for exogenously given prices of traded goods- will push up 
the relative price of nontradables –a RER appreciation. This, in turn, will in induce a 
                                                                 
2 See De Mello (1997) for a comprehensive survey of the FDI-growth literature. 
3  White (1986) argues that the analysis of FDI within the macroeconomics literature has been 
depersonalised –the talk is on FDI, rather than MNCs- and trivialised  –FDI is analysed in mere 
macroeconomic (or accounting) terms, as just another sort of external financing. 
4 In a simple static two-country model, MacDougall (1960) shows that an inflow of capital increases 
welfare in the recipient (as well as in the capital-exporting) country because it raises the marginal 
product of labour –and thus wages- by more than the decline in the marginal product of domestically-
owned capital. Capital flows may also be beneficial, as posited in the two-gap models of McKinnon 
(1964) and Chenery and Strout (1966), because they relax savings or foreign exchange constraints on 
growth in the host country. Furthermore, intertemporal models of the current account (Razin, 1995; 
Obstfeld and Rogoff, 1996) claim that capital flows can benefit the capital importing country by 
allowing it to smooth consumption over time.  
5 There are other detrimental effects of capital inflows that the literature has emphasised: surges in bank 
lending, leading to ‘over-borrowing’ and inefficient investment; asset price booms, which may fuel 
bubbles and worsen the overheating of the economy; destabilising financial effects of capital volatility, 
especially in the case of sudden reversals.For a comprehensive survey of all the relevant issues 
involved –causes, consequences, and policy implications of capital inflows- see Agenor and Montiel 
(2000).  QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS87   Page 3 
shift of demand towards tradable goods and a re-allocation of productive resources 
into the non-traded sector, thereby expanding the current account deficit.
6 
 
This literature, however, does not normally make an explicit distinction between the 
different types of flows or the specific mechanisms through which each of them 
affects aggregate demand, the current account and the RER.
7 Some analysts have 
suggested that FDI might have a lower impact on the RER than other flows, for a 
number of reasons. It is argued that FDI inflows directly finance the imports of capital 
goods (Kamin and Wood, 1998); that they are not usually intermediated through the 
domestic banking system, and thus do not lead to an expansion in domestic credit 
(Calvo, Leiderman and Reinhart, 1993); or that they are likely to crowd in domestic 
investment, which stimulates imports and expands the supply of home goods in the 
recipient country (Reisen, 1998). But these claims are hypothetical and not supported 
with formal analytical examination or empirical evidence.  
 
Another instance of disjunction in the economic treatment of FDI is the issue of its 
financial contribution. In view of the crises triggered by the sudden reversal of 
volatile capital flows, many macroeconomists and policymakers have favoured FDI as 
a comparatively beneficial source of foreign finance. Usually underscored financial 
advantages of FDI include its greater resilience
8 and the pro-cyclical nature of FDI-
related income payments.
9 However, both theoretical and empirical studies on MNC 
financial operations warn that the net financial contribution by foreign affiliates to the 
recipient economy might be limited. In its financing decision, a multinational 
company (MNC) is confronted with a trade-off between cost of capital and host-
country risk hedging. The international scope of an MNC’s operations imply higher 
agency costs than those of purely domestic enterprises (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; 
Lee and Kwok, 1988). Thus, the MNC faces an increasing marginal cost of external 
funds, and where possible, it will finance its international capital expenditures with 
internally generated cash flows (i.e. intra-MNC funds). On the other hand, the MNC 
has incentives to borrow as much as possible in the host country in order to hedge 
against exchange (and, eventually, political) risk.
10 The evidence suggests that this is 
the case: the most robust conclusion from empirical studies on MNC’s financial 
                                                                 
6 This sectoral adjustment in demand and supply is analogous to the problem caused by a boom in an 
export sub-sector, as analysed for instance by Corden (1984) or Neary and van Wijnbergen (1986), and 
is therefore generally –though somewhat inaccurately- referred to as the “Dutch disease” effect of 
capital inflows. For a survey and discussion on the transfer problem, in connection with capital inflows, 
see Eaton (1989). For a recent application of the transfer problem to the analysis of the Asian crisis, see 
Krugman (1999).   
7 Notable exceptions are Fry (1997) and Vines and Warr (2000). 
8 Empirical studies have generally confirmed that FDI is less volatile (Chuhan, Perez-Quiros and 
Popper, 1996; World Bank, 1999) or has a larger permanent component (Sarno and Taylor, 1999) than 
other capital inflows. In a frequently cited paper, Claessens, Dooley and Warner (1995) find that FDI 
and other long-term flows are no less volatile than other components of the capital account. However, 
their study is based on the time-series behaviour of net capital flows (i.e. deducting investments abroad 
by domestic residents). As Reisen (1998) argues, what matters for developing countries –in terms of 
possible reversals- is the volatility of gross inflows. 
9 Profits of foreign affiliates tend to be positively linked to the performance of the host economy, and 
so FDI liabilities are easier to service (UNCTAD, 2000). 
10 See, for instance, the models developed by Stevens (1972), Hartman (1979), Goldsbrough (1979), 
and Gilman (1981). As Caves (1996) points out, the MNC plays a double role in dealing with risk: as a 
supplier of diversification services to risk-averse creditors and shareholders, and as a risk-averse actor 
itself in its international operations. It seems, however, that in financial decisions risk aversion tends to 
prevail over agency costs and the portfolio diversification motive. QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS87   Page 4 
patterns is that the main sources of finance for foreign affiliates are funds 
accumulated (retained earnings) or borrowed in the host economy.
11 Moreover, 
because of implicit or explicit guarantees by parent companies, affiliates tend to have 
preferential access to host country bank lending, and might therefore crowd-out 
domestic investment (Shapiro, 1978; Caves, 1996). Also, the provision of foreign 
finance by MNCs to the host country is generally a function of the life cycle of the 
subsidiary. As the affiliate matures, parent funds tend to fall and investment-income 
payments from the subsidiary to increase.
12 Finally, some researchers have argued 
that high profit repatriation ratios make FDI a very expensive source of foreign 
finance, relative to the cost of international borrowing (Bos, et al., 1974; Lall and 
Streeten, 1977; Kitchen, 1986). Profit-shifting through intra-firm transfer pricing 
practices, mostly to minimise global tax payments, might further reduce the net 
provision of investible resources by foreign direct investors.
13  
 
This paper analyses the adjustment process to FDI inflows in the case of Costa Rica. 
It is based and structured on the argument that such macroeconomic adjustment 
cannot be fruitfully investigated without a study of the trade and financial practices of 
foreign affiliates in the country. The paper focuses on how the transfer process with 
regards to FDI inflows is effected, and in particular on whether, to what extent and 
through which mechanisms adjustment to inward FDI brings about a RER 
appreciation.  
 
The paper consists of six sections. Section II develops a two-sector model to capture 
the basic interactions between foreign investment, domestic investment and the RER. 
It shows that the sectoral allocation of FDI, the response of domestic investment to 
exogenous changes in the foreign capital stock, the input composition of foreign 
capital, and the financial practices of foreign investors, are crucial determinants of the 
long-run equilibrium RER. Section III is divided in two parts. The first provides an 
overview of the general trends of aggregate FDI inflows into Costa Rica in the period 
1970-99: composition, servicing costs, sectoral allocation. In the second part, it 
analyses some data on the trade and financial patterns of foreign affiliates operating in 
Costa Rica. The objective is to assess the import and export propensities of foreign-
owned firms in Costa Rica, the extent to which they engage in host country 
borrowing, and the net direct balance of payments impact associated with foreign-
owned firms’ operations (i.e. the arithmetic sum of their balance of payments 
transactions in capital and current account). Section IV undertakes an econometric 
examination of the impact of FDI on output, investment, exports, imports and the 
RER, using cointegration techniques. The study is based on annual data for the period 
1970-99. It is found that FDI exerts a strong negative impact on the equilibrium RER. 
Section V integrates the theoretical analysis with the microeconomic and econometric 




                                                                 
11 See, for instance, Robbins and Stobaugh (1973), Gilman (1981), Martinussen (1988), Feldstein 
(1994). The latter found that only 20% of the assets owned by US affiliates abroad were financed by 
cross-border flows of capital from the US.  
12 Prachowny and Richardson (1975); Salorio and Brewer (1997).  
13 Some estimates of the extent of transfer pricing by MNCs are provided by Kopits (1976) and Hines 
and Rice (1994).   QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS87   Page 5 
II. A two-sector model of equilibrium RER determination with foreign capital 
 
Consider a small open economy that produces two composite goods, tradables (T) and 
non-tradables (NT). Both types of goods can be consumed and/or invested. There are 
two agents in the economy: a) a domestic representative agent, and b) foreign 
investors. The domestic agent makes consumption and domestic investment decisions. 
Foreign investment into the economy, however, is determined exogenously. There is 
also a representative firm in each composite good sector, which acts merely as a 
passive conduit for the decisions of domestic and foreign investors. The two 
representative firms combine inputs to produce output in each sector. There is no 
explicit role for labour in the production function or in the model at large.
14 It is 
assumed that there are implicit institutional arrangements whereby factors are paid 
their marginal physical products. There is no government.   
 
Openness implies that the economy is fully integrated into the world’s goods markets 
(i.e. there are no barriers to trade). The model is real: there is no money and no credit 
markets, foreign or domestic, and thus no foreign borrowing and no international 
reserves. The only asset is physical capital, which is classified into domestic and 
foreign, according to the structure of ownership. Hence, FDI is the only component of 
the capital account of the balance of payments, with FDI flows to each sector assumed 
to be exogenous. The current account, in turn, is composed of net exports and foreign 
investment income.  
 
Smallness implies that the economy is a price taker in the international market. Thus, 
the prices of T, PT, are exogenous, and normalised to be equal to 1 (so that, where 
consistency is required, equations are expressed in terms of units of T). By contrast, 
the prices of NT, PN, are determined within the system so as to clear the NT goods 
market. Prices are assumed to be fully flexible. The real exchange rate (RER), defined 
as the relative price of T to NT (q = 1/PN), is thus a decreasing function of changes in 
PN. An increase in q indicates a real depreciation. We also define the equilibrium RER 
as the relative price of T goods consistent with NT market clearing. 
 
The assumption of full price flexibility and the exclusion of the monetary sector and 
of government imply that nominal rigidities and fiscal and/or monetary policy 
responses, which are central for the determination of the short-run evolution of the 
RER, are not considered. But in contrast with intertemporal-optimisation 
representative-agent models -such as those by Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996), Turnovsky 
(1997) or Agenor (1997)-, we do not impose the transversality condition that in the 
steady state the current account be equal to zero.
15 In this sense, our model can be 
interpreted as dealing with the long run, rather than the very long run (or steady state): 
it fully incorporates demand and supply responses into the determination of the 
equilibrium RER, but it excludes short-run nominal adjustments and policy responses 
and allows the current account to be strictly positive and equal to the net inflow of 
FDI.   
                                                                 
14 It might be assumed that there is surplus labour, as in the Lewis (1954) model, so that output is only 
constrained by capital (as long as the labour supply capacity is not met). Indeed, our simple model 
reproduces the basic Harrod-Domar and AK growth-model feature of constant returns to capital (in our 
case, constant returns to aggregate –foreign and domestic- capital). 
15 It might be argued that, in the case of FDI, which is a non-debt creating flow, the need for the current 
account to become zero in the steady state –so as to avoid Ponzi schemes- is not present. QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS87   Page 6 
 
The model is set in discrete time. To simplify notation, the time subscript t is not 
included in any equation where all variables are contemporaneous.   
 
2.1 Supply side: 
 
Goods are produced by a representative firm in each sector via a Cobb-Douglas 
technology, which combines two inputs, domestic capital and foreign capital, as 
follows: 
 
a a - =
1
N N N KF KD Q                (1) 
 
b b - =
1
T T T KF KD Q ,              (2) 
 
where Qi is total supply in the i
th sector, KDi and KFi are the stocks of domestic and 
foreign capital in each sector, " i = N, T; and 0  £  a,  b  £ 1
16. There are no 
intermediate goods in the economy, and thus QN and QT represent both total output 
and total value added in each sector. 
 
The domestic and foreign capital stocks evolve according to: 
 
D
t i t i t i I KD KD 1 , 1 , , - - + =         (3) 
 
F
t i t i t i I KF KF 1 , 1 , , - - + = ,       (4) 
 
" i = N,T, and  where I
D (I
F) is domestic (foreign) capital formation. There is no 
depreciation. 
 
The economy’s real gross domestic product (GDP) in terms of tradables (Y), is given 
by: 
 




                 (5) 
 
If foreign investment income (FY) is deducted from GDP, one obtains the economy’s 
gross national product, GNP, which in this case is equal to disposable income (Y
d): 
 
FY Y Y GNP
d - = =          (6) 
 
Constant returns to scale in the production function imply that income is exhausted by 
factor payments. Also, we assume that factors are paid their marginal products. Since 
                                                                 
16 Since we are not interested in the explicit modelling of productivity growth, we have left it out of the 
analysis. However, it could be assumed that the production functions (1) and (2) implicitly incorporate 
a Hicks-neutral productivity shifter, so that the stocks of inputs are measured in effective units. 
Alternatively, it could be assumed that technological growth is foreign-capital augmenting and already 
embedded in KFi, or that it is a function of foreign capital, as in Borensztein, et al (1998), so that the 
combined supply impact of foreign investment and technological progress is reflected in KFi and its 
output elasticity parameters (1-a) and (1-b).    QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS87   Page 7 
GNP is equal to the share of GDP accruing to domestic agents, from (1) and (2) it 
stems that Y





Y b a + =
1
               (7) 
 
2.2 Demand side: 
 
Aggregate demand consists of consumption, investment and net exports. 
 
Consumption.  The domestic representative agent makes the consumption decision 
following a two-stage process. First, the consumer decides how much to spend in total 
consumption, and then she allocates that amount between the consumption of T and 
NT. Total consumption levels are constrained at any time by current disposable 
income, following a simple Keynesian function: 
 
d cY C = ,       0 £ c £ 1             (8) 
 
The consumer allocates total consumption between T and NT so as to maximise a 




T N = +
1
              (9) 
 
Let us assume that V(￿) takes a Cobb-Douglas form, so that 
 
s s - =
1 ) , ( T N T N C C C C V ,  0 £ s £ 1            (10) 
 












          (11) 
 
By substituting (11) into (9), one can derive expressions for the optimal levels of CN 
and CT as functions of q and overall consumption: 
 
qC CN s =                 (12) 
 
C CT ) 1 ( s - =             (13) 
 
Investment. Capital is accumulated using T and NT goods as inputs. It is assumed that 
capital production technologies are the same regardless of the sector of destination of 
the capital goods.  
 
Foreign investment  flows, their composition (retained earnings plus cross-border 
equity and debt flows), their sectoral allocation, and the breakdown of foreign 
investment income into retained earnings and profit remittances, are all exogenously QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS87   Page 8 
determined. A fraction g of foreign investment is financed with host-country funds, 
and the rest via FDI. Thus: 
 








F            (14) 
 
where 0 £ g £ 1 and gI
F is the net amount of domestic savings flowing to foreign 
investors in each period, once debt servicing payments to the domestic agent have 
been discounted.
17 From (1) and (2), and the assumption that factors are paid their 
marginal products, foreign investment income (FY) can be expressed as: 
 
T N Q Q
q
FY ) 1 ( ) 1 (
1
b a - + - =        (15) 
 
Domestic  investment follows a three-step process: first, the aggregate amount of 
investment is determined; then the agent combines T and NT inputs to produce capital 
goods; and finally she decides how to allocate investment between the two sectors.  
 
Since there is no foreign borrowing and no assets other than physical capital, savings 
equals investment at all times, and national income (GNP) must be either consumed 
or invested. Also, local borrowing by foreign investors directly crowds out domestic 
investment by an amount  gI
F.
  18 From (8), it follows that aggregate domestic 
investment (I






D I Y c I I I g - - = + = ) 1 ( ,          (16) 
 
where (1-c) is the marginal propensity to save out of disposable income.  
 
The production function for capital goods exhibits a Cobb-Douglas (unitary elasticity 
of substitution) technology, so that the agent’s input allocation problem can be 
described as: 
 





T N I       (17) 
s.t.  I T N
q
I I = +
1
       (18) 
 
where NI (TI) is the number of units of NT (T) goods used in the production of I units 
of capital, measured in terms of T, and 0 £ d £ 1. If the technological parameters are 
allowed to differ between domestic and foreign investors, the optimal input 
combinations are given by: 
 
                                                                 
17 In principle, total debt servicing by foreign investors could exceed the amount of new host-country 
funds they receive in any given period. However, we assume that g is a parametric constant, and 
impose a non-negativity constraint on it. We could therefore think of g as a long-run average of the 
ratio of net resource transfers to foreign investors over I
F.  
18 There is no explicit treatment of the financial sector, but this direct crowding-out effect could be seen 








I I T I T F D ) 1 ( ; ) 1 ( 2 1 d d - = - =          (20) 
 
To allocate domestic investment between sectors, the domestic agent chooses in 
period t the sectoral domestic capital stocks for t+1 which maximise GNP subject to 
the accumulation constraints (3), (4) and (16), taking the sectoral foreign capital 
stocks and q for t+1 as given. Domestic capital is assumed to be freely mobile across 
sectors. Expectations are formed rationally with perfect foresight and there is no 
uncertainty. Thus, the problem can be expressed as
19: 
 
b b a a b a














KF KD KF KD
q
Y
t T t N





t t T t N t T t N I Y c KD KD KD KD 1 1 1 , 1 , , , ) 1 ( - - - - - - + + = + g          (22) 
and 
F
t i t i t i I KF KF 1 , 1 , , - - + =         (4) 
 
The constraint (22) can be used to obtain an expression for KDT, and substitute it into 
the objective function (21). After some rearrangement and simplification, the first-












b a =            (23) 
 
This is an intuitively simple arbitrage condition: the domestic agent should invest in 
each sector up to the point where the (expected) marginal return to domestic capital is 
equalised in both sectors.
20 Since (23) reflects the optimal domestic capital stocks in 
every period, the domestic investment demand functions can be derived from there. It 
can be shown  -by using (1) and (2) in (23) and taking total differentials- that 
investment in T (NT) is an increasing (decreasing) function of q. 
 
Net exports.  Foreign demand for T is assumed to be infinitely inelastic at the given 
price, and hence the trade balance is given residually as resulting from the balance 
between domestic demand for and supply of T. 
 
Aggregate demand. Aggregate demand, D, for each sector is thus: 
 
[ ]
F F d d
N I q I Y c q cY q D 2 1 ) 1 ( d g d s + - - + =          (24) 
 
[ ]
F F d d
T I I Y c cY D ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( 2 1 d g d s - + - - - + - =          (25) 
                                                                 
19 It can be shown that this problem is equivalent to an inter-temporal optimisation exercise where the 
objective function is to maximise the net present value of disposable income subject to the future 
stream of accumulation constraints over an infinite horizon. In essence, the lack of inter-temporal 
substitution -posed by the absence of borrowing and the Keynesian specification of consumption and 
investment- makes the inter-temporal optimisation framework collapse into one of single-period 
optimisation.  
20 Here, the marginal rate of return to domestic capital is measured as the marginal contribution of 
domestic capital to GNP, in units of T.  Since capital is held and expressed in terms of the tradable 
good, whose nominal price is assumed fixed, there are no capital gains in the model.  QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS87   Page 10 
 
2.3 Market clearing condition and flow constraints 
 
The RER (q) adjusts so that the NT market clears at all times: 
 
N N D Q =            (26) 
 
The economy’s overall budget constraint is given by: 
  
FY I I C FDI FDI Y
F D
T N + + + = + +                (27) 
 
Since (27) is obtained residually from the specific constraints on C, I
D and I
F, it is not 
separately binding. The balance of payments equilibrium is also obtained residually 
as: 
 
FY Q D FDI FDI T T T N + - = + ,             (28) 
 
where the left-hand side of (28) is the capital account and the right-hand side is the 
current account.
21 Therefore, the economy permanently runs a current account deficit 




2.4 Equilibrium real exchange rate and comparative statics 
 
Plugging (24) into (26), using (7), (8), (12), (14) and (16), and solving for q, one 
obtains the equilibrium RER (q*) as a function of sectoral output and FDI: 
 
[ ]











g d d b d b s
a d a s
1
) ( ) 1 (









N          (29) 
 
Since 0 £ s, c, a, d1 £ 1, then  0 ] ) 1 ( 1 [ 1 ‡ - - - a d a s c c .
23 Similarly, the bracketed 
expression to the left of QT is positive. Therefore, (29) implies that the equilibrium 
RER depreciates with QN and appreciates with QT.  
 
                                                                 
21 This is consistent with the balance-of-payments accounting convention of recording all foreign 
investment income, including retained earnings, as an outflow in the current account, while 
simultaneously including retained earnings as an FDI inflow in the capital account.   
22 Note, however, that the trade balance (= QT - DT) can be in surplus or in deficit depending on 
whether foreign investment income is greater or less than the net inward flow of FDI (or, in other 
words, whether dividend remittances are greater or less than cross-border FDI flows).  
 
 
23 This might not be immediately apparent. But consider the limiting case first: if parameters s, a, and 
d1 all took a value of 1 (the maximum possible value within the restrictions imposed), then, whatever 
the value of c,  1 ) 1 ( 1 = - + a d a s c c , and hence the expression in square brackets would be equal to 
zero. For any other combination of parameter values equal to or greater than zero and strictly less than 
one, the expression in square brackets would be strictly positive.  QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS87   Page 11 
The contemporaneous impact of QN on q* operates through two channels: supply and 
demand. By increasing the supply of NT goods, a rise  in Q N tends to lower their 
relative price (i.e. to increase q). However, an increase in QN also expands disposable 
income (see equation 7), thereby triggering an increase in the demand for NT goods, 
which in turn appreciates the RER. But, given that  0 ] ) 1 ( 1 [ 1 ‡ - - - a d a s c c , the 
supply effect unambiguously dominates the demand effect. Q T, on the other hand, 
only affects the equilibrium RER through the disposable income channel (demand 
effect); hence its unambiguously negative impact.   
 
The impact of FDI on the equilibrium RER 
 
There are two different mechanisms through which foreign investment affects q*: a) a 
direct, intra-temporal demand effect; and b) inter-temporal supply and demand 
effects. 
 
The intra-temporal demand effect depends on the sign of (d2 - d1g), and is therefore 
ambiguous.
24 If there is no financial crowding-out of domestic firms by foreign 
investors (g = 0), then FDI –regardless of the sector into which it flows- would have 
an unambiguously negative direct impact on q*. The size of this effect would depend 
on the extent to which foreign firms use NT goods for capital formation (d2). This is 
the typical RER appreciation mechanism –an aggregate demand increase- highlighted 
by the literature on the potential “Dutch disease” problem associated with foreign 
capital inflows. But if ( g  ‡ 0), the (negative) demand impact of FDI on q* is 
weakened, and could even turn positive, if d1g ‡ d2. The reason for this is that the 
introduction of a direct financial crowding out mechanism reduces aggregate demand 
–and the demand for NT- for any given value of the relevant parameters and any 
given level of domestic output and FDI. Whereas with g = 0, FDI represents a net 
addition to aggregate demand, it now partially displaces domestic investment demand. 
And, for a sufficiently large differential in the NT share of investment expenditure 
between domestic and foreign agents, FDI could even trigger a RER depreciation. 
Though the latter outcome is improbable, because g is likely to be significantly less 
than one, the main implication of the analysis is that financial crowding out might 
reduce the intra-temporal real appreciation effect of FDI for plausible values of the 
input demand parameters.  
 
In addition to the intra-temporal demand channel, foreign investment also affects the 
RER through its impact on the sectoral foreign capital stocks, and thus on QN and QT. 
But this effect is inter-temporal rather than contemporaneous: it only comes into force 
from the next period onwards, as per equations (4) and (14), and so does not affect the 
equilibrium RER at time t.  
 
In the case of FDIN, the inter-temporal mechanism consists of a direct output effect, 
an indirect investment effect, and an indirect demand effect: 
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§ FDIN expands KFN and therefore the supply of NT, with a direct positive output 
effect on q.   
§ Also, FDIN exerts a positive effect on the RER arising from the input 
complementarity property of the Cobb-Douglas production technology. Thus, 
increases in KFN push up the marginal return to domestic capital in the NT 
sector
25, attracting more domestic investment into NT, which further increases the 
output of NT goods and pushes down their relative price, until the marginal 
revenue product of capital in both sectors is equalised.  
§ Finally, the increase in QN expands disposable income and thus tends to appreciate 
the RER. But, as stated above, parameter restrictions imply that this second-round 
demand effect is dominated by the supply effect.  
 
By contrast, the inter-temporal FDIT effect only operates through the indirect 
investment and demand (disposable income) channels. Because of input 
complementarity, an expansion in KFT leads to a larger share of domestic investment 
in T over total investment, thus reducing the expansion of the domestic capital stock 
and of output in the NT sector, and appreciating the RER, ceteris paribus. The 
disposable income channel also has a negative impact on q. 
 
In sum, the intra-temporal and inter-temporal effects of foreign investment into NT 
work in opposite directions, and the net effect of FDIN on q* is therefore ambiguous. 
On the contrary, flows of foreign investment into the T sector exert unambiguous 
pressure towards RER appreciation through both channels.   
 
FDI and the Harrod-Balassa-Samuelson effect: 
 
The relative prices of NT goods tend to be downward trending and higher in rich 
countries than in poorer ones. This empirical regularity was pointed out by Harrod, 
Balassa and Samuelson, and explained analytically by a number of authors in the 
dependent economy, two-sector tradition.
26 In essence, the theoretical argument is 
that, in developed countries, productivity growth differentials between the T and the 
NT sectors are not only positive and increasing (the time-series dimension) but also 
higher than in poorer countries (the cross-country  dimension). If labour is mobile 
across sectors, productivity differentials lead to a higher economy-wide wage, and 
thereby to higher relative prices of NT.
27  
 
Our model reproduces the time-series dimension of the Harrod-Balassa-Samuelson 
effect through an analogous mechanism. A relatively high exogenous rate of foreign 
investment in the T sector pushes q down by increasing disposable income and the 
demand for NT relative to supply. High foreign investment in T could be thought of 
                                                                 
25 Complementarity derives from the fact that the marginal physical product of domestic (foreign) 
capital in sector i increases with the foreign (domestic) capital stock in the same sector. Thus, for 
instance, in (1): 
0 ) 1 (
) / ( 1 ‡ - =
¶
¶ ¶ ¶ - - a a a a N N
N
N N KF KD
KF
KD Q
, and similarly for the T sector. 
26 For a comprehensive survey on the theory and the empirical evidence, see Froot and Rogoff (1995). 
See also De Gregorio, et al. (1994) and Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996). 
27 The effect is magnified if the NT sector is relatively labour-intensive, because then the wage effect 
has a stronger impact on relative prices (i.e. the overall income effect outweighs the substitution effect). QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS87   Page 13 
as consistent with (or as leading to) higher productivity growth in that sector, if FDI 
involves positive technological spillovers or technological growth is a function of 
foreign capital (see, for instance, de Mello, 1997; or Borensztein, et al.,1998).  
 
Input composition of foreign investment, financial crowding-out, and the equilibrium 
RER 
 
Finally, we are interested in isolating the impact of two specific parameters on q*: the 
tradable-good-intensity of foreign capital formation (1-d2), and the extent of financial 
crowding-out of local firms by foreign investors (g).  
 
The equilibrium RER is decreasing in  d2
28. The higher the NT share of foreign 
investment, the more appreciated the RER will have to be in equilibrium. Therefore, 
the more intensive I
F is in T goods (or, analogously, the higher the import-propensity 
of foreign-owned firms), the lower the RER appreciation effect of FDI.  
  
On the other hand, the sign of the partial derivative of (29) with respect to the 
financial crowding-out parameter (g) is ambiguous, and depends on the relative size of 
d1 and d2.
29 If, for instance, d1 ‡ d2, that is, the share of NT in investment expenditure 
is greater for domestic agents (d1) than for foreign agents (d2) -a likely scenario- then 
the larger the extent of financial crowding out, the more depreciated the RER in 
equilibrium. This is because the displacement of relatively NT-intensive domestic 
investment by foreign investment would reduce the demand for NT goods and 
therefore their relative price, ceteris paribus.  
 
In the next section, evidence on some of the mechanisms identified by the model as 
crucial for the analysis of adjustment to FDI will be examined. 
 
III.  Costa Rica: FDI inflows and foreign affiliate operating patterns 
 
3.1 FDI inflows to Costa Rica: Overview of aggregate trends, 1970-99   
 
Political stability and relatively skilled labour have allowed CR to attract large 
inflows of FDI. The FDI/GDP ratio averaged 2.7% between 1970 and 1999, and has 
not fallen below 1% of GDP in any year. But the pattern has been uneven. FDI 
inflows increased sharply between 1970 and 1975, both in absolute terms and as a 
share of GDP. In the second half of the 1970s, as the economy expanded fast through 
a commodity price boom and fiscal reflation, the FDI/GDP ratio dipped. It recovered 
somewhat in 1981, and fell again in 1982 with the debt crisis, but remained stable 
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until 1986. After that year, FDI inflows started a notorious upward trend, reaching 
US$619 million in 1999, from a level of US$60 million in 1986. Between those same 
years, the FDI/GDP ratio  increased from 1.4% to 5.5% (see charts 1 and 2 in 
Appendix 1). This surge in FDI has coincided with a substantial change in economic 
policies.  
 
As most other Latin American countries, CR moved from a protectionist, import-
substituting model of development in the 1960s and 1970s to an export-oriented 
strategy from the second half of the 1980s onwards. The transition was marked by the 
debt crisis of 1982, when GDP fell by 7.28% and annual inflation reached 91%. After 
undergoing an orthodox stabilisation programme, the country embarked on a process 
of liberalisation and deregulation, including the opening up of trade and the capital 
account. In the mid 1980s, a number of tax subsidies and incentive regimes (free trade 
zones and temporary admission) for export-oriented foreign and domestic firms were 
introduced. The incentives were intended to make up for the anti-export bias of the 
previous development strategy, and to foster the expansion and diversification of the 
export sector. In terms of attracting FDI, the new policies proved a success: FDI 
increased substantially in the 1990s, and started to flow towards higher-wage, high-
tech industries. The process culminated in 1996, when Intel Corp. set up a large 
micro-processor assembly plant in CR. 
 
FDI flows are the sum of two components: cross-border flows (parent company equity 
and debt flows), and retained earnings. Contrary to the experience of other countries, 
retained earnings have not been a very substantial part of FDI flows to CR (see chart 1 
in Appendix 1). As shown in table 1, the average ratio of retained earnings to FDI has 
ranged between 7.4% for the period 1980-89 to 23.2% in the 1990s. Therefore, on 
average, more than three quarters of net FDI inflows to the country have been made 
up of fresh, cross-border flows.     
 
Table 1. FDI inflows to Costa Rica: Composition, cost and related resource transfer 
1970-99 
 
  Composition    Cost    Net FDI 
transfer 










  FDINRT/ 
FDI 1 




(average)    (average)  (average)    (average) 
1970-79  444.3394  76.4712  0.1425    0.0311  0.0174    0.6823 
1980-89  716.7150  79.3240  0.0741    0.0167  0.0105    0.7738 
1990-99  3513.0020  817.2514  0.2326    0.0746  0.0472    0.61212 
1 FDINRT: FDI-related net resource transfers (FDI inflows minus FDI income) 
2 Average for the period 1990-98. If 1999 (an outlier year) is included, the figure becomes 0.3879 
Source: Author’s own calculation, with data from Banco Central de Costa Rica 
     
The return on FDI, as measured by total FDI income (retained earnings plus profit 
remittances) over the FDI stock, has also been relatively low, ranging between an 
average of 1.7% in the 1980s to an average of 7.46% in the 1990s (table 1).
30 The 
                                                                 
30 Admittedly, these figures underestimate the true cost of FDI, as they do not include interest payments 
on parent company debt, royalty payments and other fee outflows often used by foreign investors to QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS87   Page 15 
ratio of profit remittances (only) to the FDI stock replicate the same pattern. The 
figures suggest that the cost of FDI has been very pro-cyclical: income as a share of 
total FDI stock fell substantially during the 1980s, a decade of poor growth 
performance for the economy after the debt crisis, and picked up during the 1990s. 
1999 was an outlier year: profit remittances grew from US$266 million to US$1,512 
million (or 31% of the FDI stock), mostly reflecting large profit repatriations by Intel. 
But even if that year is excluded, there seems to have been a slight increase in the cost 
of FDI in the 1990s. As a share of FDI levels, FDI income remained at moderate 
levels in the 1970-99 period. Thus, FDI-related net resource transfers (FDI inflows 
minus FDI income) as a ratio of FDI inflows averaged 68.2% in the 1970s, 77.4% in 
the 1980s, and 61.2% in the 1990s (table 1). 
 
The pattern of FDI allocation by sector has also fluctuated over the 1970-99 period. In 
the 1970s, most FDI inflows (54.3% of total) went into manufacturing, while 
agriculture only accounted for 40.4%. In the 1980s, the picture shifted: agriculture 
took 58.6% of the FDI inflows, while the share of manufacturing fell to 32.5%. This 
probably reflects the fact that, when export incentive regimes were introduced in the 
1980s, the fastest growing sector was that of non-traditional agricultural exports, such 
as citric fruits, melons, pineapples, fish, and flowers, and foreign investment flew 
mainly to these activities. In the 1990s, however, foreign  investment in export 
processing plants –first textiles, later higher technology industries- dominated: the 
share of manufacturing in total FDI inflows rose to 54%. FDI to other (tertiary) 
sectors remained comparatively small in the 1970s and 1980s. But a boom in tourism 
into the country has attracted large foreign investments in hotels and restaurants, and 
there has also been an increase in FDI into call centres and other customer service 
facilities. As a result, the share of tertiary activities in total FDI  overtook agriculture 
and reached an average of 28.1% in the 1990s. But the stock of FDI in agriculture and 
manufacturing together account for over 80% of the total FDI stock.      
 
Table 2. FDI inflows to Costa Rica: Sectoral allocation 
1970-99  
 
  Agriculture    Manufacturing    Other 
                 















                 
1970-79  179.701  0.4045    241.3061  0.5431    23.358  0.0526 
1980-89  419.8905  0.5859    232.6782  0.3247    64.0253  0.0893 
1990-99  629.4621  0.1792    1896.832  0.5399    986.7306  0.2809 
Source: Author’s own calculation, with data from Banco Central de Costa Rica 
 
3.2 Trade and financial patterns of foreign affiliates in Costa Rica 
 
This section seeks to present briefly some background microeconomic evidence to 
support and inform the analysis of aggregate data. Two main sets of data will be used:  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
repatriate funds. Unfortunately, balance of payments data published by the Central Bank of Costa Rica 
or the IMF do not distinguish between payments on these accounts made by foreign or domestic agents.  QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS87   Page 16 
§ A firm-level data set I assembled on the operations of foreign-owned companies 
as well as CR firms (to be used as a control group) in the Free Trade Zone (FTZ) 
and temporary admission (TA) regimes, based on the annual reports submitted by 
the companies. Results are presented for the year 1998. The sample includes a 
total of 213 firms: 25 domestic and 113 foreign-owned in FTZ; 26 domestic and 
49 foreign-owned in TA. The total sample accounted for 21.1% of total CR 
exports in 1998 (and foreign firms alone for 19.5%) and 15.2% of CR’s gross 
fixed private investment (foreign firms in the sample account f or 14.2% of that 
figure). The sample, on the other hand, is dominated by FTZ firms, which made 
up 86% of exports, 93% of gross fixed investment, 85% of gross property, plant 
and equipment, and 75% of total assets (78%) in 1998. Because of this, and 
because of the larger number of foreign-owned firms in FTZ, this sub-sample is 
deemed more representative.  
 
§ Data published by the US Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Economic 
Analysis (BEA) on affiliates of US MNCs operating in CR.
31 The latter includes 
financial and operating data on majority-owned foreign affiliates (MOFAs) for the 
period 1989-97
32, as well as information on FDI and balance of payments 
transactions between all US foreign affiliates in CR and their US parents for the 
period 1982-98. US MOFAs represent a substantial fraction of CR’s total GDP, 
fixed investment and exports (figures for 1997 were 5.7%, 4.4%, and 40.4%, 
respectively). Also, the FDI stock of US affiliates surveyed by BEA accounted for 
48.5% of CR’s total FDI stock in 1998.    
 
3.2.1 Balance of payments effects:  
 
Table A.1 provides a summary view of FDI and balance of payments data for US 
MOFAs in CR, for selected years in the period 1982-1998. It shows that reinvested 
earnings made up a more significant fraction of total FDI flows –an average of 39% 
over the period- than is the case for the country’s aggregate data. The BEA data set 
includes interest payments as part of net FDI income, and it also records royalties and 
other service payments from affiliates to parents. From these data, a more 
comprehensive figure for the return on FDI, based on the ratio of total FDI income 
plus net service payments to the FDI stock, was computed. The average return over 
the period is 21.74%, much higher than the corresponding aggregate figures for CR.
33 
From Table A1 one can also infer that reinvested earnings in the 1990s accounted for 
most of FDI income, and that cross-border FDI flows and FDI-related net resource 
transfers for US MOFAs are much lower as a share of total FDI flows than the 
equivalent f igures for CR. Finally, I estimated a proxy for the direct balance-of-
payments effects of US MOFAs in CR. The trade balance was approximated as the 
difference between total exports and imports from the US by the foreign affiliates.
34 
                                                                 
31 The BEA does not publish data on firms owned by US individuals. Therefore, at any point in time, 
BEA statistics record only a fraction of total US FDI. 
32 MOFAs accounted for 95% of all US affiliates in CR surveyed by the BEA, and an equally large 
share of all sales, assets and employment.   
33 However, if we deduct reinvested earnings –which are not a true leakage- from FDI income, to 
obtain distributed profits, and use this figure (plus service payments) instead in the computation of the 
cost of FDI, the resulting average for 1982-1998 is 5.73%. This suggests that most of the return to US 
FDI in CR is reinvested in the country. 
34 Unfortunately, BEA does not produce statistics on total imports by foreign affiliates, but only their 
imports from the US. Though presumably these constitute a substantial fraction of total imports (if QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS87   Page 17 
The total net direct effect
35 was estimated as the sum of the trade balance proxy plus 
cross-border FDI inflows less distributed profits less net service payments to 
parents.
36 The resulting net direct balance of payments effect has been positive, very 
large, and increasing in the 1990s.  
 
Therefore, overall US foreign affiliate operations in CR produce a surplus of foreign 
exchange, which ceteris paribus would appreciate the RER.    
 
3.2.2 Trade patterns: Import and export propensities 
 
As table A2 shows, the export ratios (exports/total sales) of all firms in FTZ and TA 
are very high –not surprising given the nature and objectives of those regimes-. While 
export ratios are higher for foreign firms, the difference is only statistically significant 
in the case of TA firms. Information on import ratios (as a share of purchases) is more 
enlightening. Total import and input import ratios are much higher for foreign-owned 
firms, and statistically significantly so in the case of FTZ.
37 Since machinery and 
equipment tend to be mostly imported (even outside special regimes), the propensity 
to import intermediate inputs provides a better indicator of the linkages of the 
different groups of firms with the domestic economy. The data suggests that links 
with local suppliers are very poor in the case of foreign-owned firms in FTZ, many of 
which are assembly plants importing most of their inputs from the parent company.  
 
Data for US MOFAs broadly confirms these findings (see table A3). Export 
propensities for US affiliates -both as a share of sales and as ratio of the firms’ value 
added-, are very high, and have increased markedly over the 1990s. Indeed, while the 
average exports/GDP ratio for CR over the 1989-1998 period was 0.39, for US 
MOFAs it was 2.34 (the corresponding figures for 1998 were 0.54 and 6.14). 
Unfortunately, BEA does not publish data on total imports by US MOFAs, but only 
on their imports from the US. Thus, the figures only provide a lower bound on import 
propensities. The average 1989-98 US import/value-added ratio for US MOFAs was 
40%, compared to an average goods imports/GDP ratio of 37% for CR as a whole 
(and a US imports/GDP ratio of 15%). It is therefore possible to infer that US 
MOFAs’ output has a higher import content than the CR economy as a whole. 
 
3.2.3 Financial operations: Extent of host-country borrowing 
 
Do foreign firms use host-country non-commercial credit as a substantial source of 
finance? For the FTZ and TA data sets, it was not possible to determine the name and 
country of origin of the financial lenders for some of the firms that reported strictly 
positive financial liabilities. But table A2 shows the results for the cases where 
identification was possible. The pattern is unmistakable: whereas 97.5% of all 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
imports are equally US-driven as exports are), clearly our approximation of the trade balance will 
overstate the trade surplus.    
35 We stress that it is only a direct effect. The operations of US foreign affiliates are likely to indirectly 
impact on a number of components of the balance of payments.  
36 BEA does not publish data on total net service payments by foreign affiliates, but only on payments 
to their parents. The former could be greater or smaller than the latter, but it is reasonable to assume 
that, in the net, foreign affiliates in CR would be net payers of royalties and license fees. 
37 Despite being much higher on average than those of their domestic counterparts, import and input 
import ratios for foreign firms in TA have a very large within-group variance, which drives the F-
statistic downwards in the ANOVA tests.  QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS87   Page 18 
financial liabilities contracted by CR firms in the FTZ came from CR-owned banks or 
other CR financial institutions, the ratio is 44% for foreign-owned firms
38, a 
statistically significant difference at the 1% level. The same result emerges when the 
ratio of domestic financial liabilities to total liabilities is considered, an indicator that 
conveys more clearly the idea that domestic borrowing by foreign-owned firms is 
truly negligible (less than 2% on average in both FTZ and TA) as a share of total 
liabilities. Furthermore, foreign firms’ ratio of non-financial long-term liabilities to 
other sources of non-commercial finance was more than double that for CR firms (and 
again, the difference is significant at the 1% level).
39 Out of 73 foreign firms with 
non-financial long-term liabilities, we identified 49 (67%) which had contracted these 
liabilities with related parties (mainly the parent company or shareholders). Moreover, 
these identified cases amount to 86% of total non-financial long-term liabilities. It is 




In sum, foreign-owned firms do not appear to resort much to host-country financial 
credit. Most of their non-commercial financing derives from intra-MNC debt.   
 
3.2.4 Relationship between FDI and gross fixed investment by foreign-owned firms      
 
A mistake commonly made in economic analyses of FDI is to identify FDI flows with 
gross fixed capital formation (GFCF) by foreign firms.
41 FDI –as recorded in the 
balance of payments- is an entirely financial concept. FDI might be used to finance 
GFCF, but also current assets or the acquisition of already-existing fixed assets (as in 
cross-border mergers and acquisitions).
42 Moreover, GFCF by foreign-owned firms 
might be financed with alternative sources other than FDI; for i nstance, domestic 
borrowing, local equity or bond issues, or foreign borrowing from unrelated parties.
 43 
The BEA data set allows for an analysis of the relationship between FDI and US 
                                                                 
38 Corresponding figures for TA are 90% for foreign firms and 57% for CR firms. 
39 Similarly, the ratio of non-financial long-term debt to assets is considerably and statistically 
significantly higher for foreign firms than for domestic firms in both FTZ and TA. 
40 Unfortunately, BEA statistics do not include information on local financial borrowing by US 
affiliates in CR. But the leverage ratio and the FDI stock/asset ratio can usefully be interpreted to 
provide a ceiling to host-country borrowing: total local financing relative to assets cannot exceed the 
leverage ratio or the difference between 1 and the FDI stock/asset ratio, whichever is smaller. (The 
ratio can actually be much smaller than the ceiling if –as is often the case- a good part of non-parent 
company debt is accounted for by trade payables, or by loans from non-US shareholders). For instance, 
the local borrowing/asset ratio in 1998 must have been less than 25%, although the ceiling was as high 
as 50% in 1990-91(see table A3). 
41 For instance, in a frequently cited paper, Boreznstein, et al. (1998) argue that, in a regression of total 
investment on FDI, “…since data on total investment include FDI, a coefficient equal to one would 
imply that FDI does not affect the total level of investment” (p. 128).  As Feenstra put it, “there is a 
good deal of confusion about even the most elementary aspects of FDI…Some of this confusion is due 
to contradictory data, but in other cases, it represents genuine conceptual misunderstandings about 
FDI.” (Feenstra, 1999: 332). 
42 There are no consistent data series on the extent of cross-border mergers and acquisitions 
(CBM&As) in CR. UNCTAD’s annual World Investment Report, however, reports some figures 
starting in 1989. The cumulative sum of CBM&As between 1989 and 1999 is US$311 million, or only 
0.086 of inward FDI flows. Furthermore, CR has not carried out any major privatisations, another 
common source of CBM&As. Therefore, it is likely that most recorded FDI into CR has been in the 
form of greenfield investment or the financing of already set-up affiliates by their parents.     
43 However, data on foreign affiliates’ capital expenditures are not normally available, and thus FDI 
flows may justifiably be used as a proxy.  QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS87   Page 19 
foreign affiliates’ GFCF in CR. Indeed, the average 1994-98 FDI/GFCF ratio was 
4.21 (see table A3). Thus, on average, only 23.75% of FDI translates into fixed 
investment. The bulk of FDI to US MOFAs finances current assets, including 
inventories and trade receivables.
44 If these findings are extrapolated to FDI flows to 
CR as a whole, it is then possible to expect that FDI flows while have little direct 
impact on total (or private) GFCF.  
 




In this section, I analyse the impact of FDI inflows to Costa Rica on output, 
investment, exports, imports and the RER, using annual data for the period 1970-99. 
The focus is on the long-run effects of FDI –in particular on the RER-. Since most of 
the variables involved are nonstationary
45, I use cointegration techniques for 
econometric estimation. Moreover, cointegration has a very useful economic 
interpretation. For there to be a meaningful long-run relationship between 
nonstationary variables, there must be a time-invariant linear combination between 
them. That linear combination  -the cointegrating vector- defines a long-run 
equilibrium to which the system, even if subject to stochastic short-run shocks, 
converges over time. Thus, cointegrating solutions may be interpreted as long-run 
equilibria between the variables. 
 
Given the shortness of the sample period, a full dynamic single-equation estimation 
framework is used.
46 In its most general form, a dynamic specification may be 
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44 Indeed, current assets accounted for 61% of total assets of US MOFAs in 1998 (non-inventory 
current assets alone –comprising mainly receivables-, was 54.49% of total assets), while net property, 
plant and equipment was only 23.79%. 
45 Results of ADF unit roots are not shown for brevity, but may be obtained from the author upon 
request. 
46 Johansen’s systems approach is asymptotically optimal, but the dimensionality problem –the number 
of parameters to be estimated in a VAR rises geometrically with the number of variables and the lag 
length- preclude its use in small samples. Dimensionality is exacerbated by the cross-contamination 
problem of systems estimation: the biases from misspecifying one equation are carried over to the rest, 
which then requires full specification of any variable included. Monte Carlo simulations suggest that 
Johansen’s technique performs very poorly in small samples, with very large standard errors, fat tails 
(skewed distributions) and substantial mean biases. See Hargreaves (1994).   QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS87   Page 20 
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1 1 1 / a b  is the long-run multiplier of y with respect to x j. 
The parameters of the long-run equilibrium relationship may thus be obtained by 
estimating (1) by OLS and then solving for kj. It is apparent that the long-run solution 
in (2), though linear in variables, is non-linear in parameters.
47 Hence, standard errors 
for the long-run parameters must be obtained using a non-linear algorithm.
48  
 
There are a number of possible linear transformations of (1) which imply equivalent 
projections of y on to the data. In particular, (1) might be transformed into an error-
correction (ECM) specification. In the ADL (1,1;1) case, this would yield: 
 
t t t t t x x k y y e b a a + D + - - + = D - - 0 1 1 1 1 0 ) )( 1 (     (3)  
 
where, as before,  ) 1 /( ) ( 1 1 0 1 a b b - + = k . Sims, Stock and Watson (1990) show that 
the statistical properties of ECM models –in particular, consistent and asymptotically 
normal estimators- extend to the family of unrestricted ADL linear transforms such as 
(1). The intuition is straightforward: a model contains exactly the same information as 
any of its unrestricted linear transformations. The OLS estimation of an ADL model 
therefore presents a number of statistical advantages when dealing with nonstationary 
data and small samples:  
 
a. Asymptotic and finite sample properties. In an ECM model such as (3) -as long as 
the nonstationary variables are cointegrated, so that  ) 0 ( ~ ) ( 1 1 1 I x k y t t - - - -, all the 
terms will be stationary, and their coefficient estimators will not only be consistent 
but also have asymptotically normal joint distributions. Thus, standard statistical 
inferences using t- and F- tests are valid. By extension, these properties apply to the 
unrestricted ADL model.
49 Moreover, dynamic specifications such as the ADL or 
ECM eliminate or substantially reduce the finite-sample biases arising from static 
estimation of long-run equilibrium parameters.
50 
 
b. Cointegration tests. The estimation of dynamic models allows for a direct test of 
cointegration, based not on Dickey Fuller tests of the residuals –as in the standard 
Engle-Granger two-step procedure- but on estimated coefficients. If there is 
cointegration between nonstationary variables, it must be possible to represent them in 
ECM form (Engle-Granger Representation Theorem). Therefore, a t-test on whether 
the ECM coefficient ([a1-1] in (3)) is statistically significantly different from zero 
would be a valid test under the null of no cointegration. Given the statistical 
equivalence between ECM and ADL, the corresponding t -test for the generalised 
                                                                 
47 The long-run parameters (kj) entail ratios of sums of individual parameters (a and b) in the full 
dynamic ADL model (3). 
48 PcGive, for instance, uses a procedure that involves numerical differentiation. 
49 Banerjee, et al. (1993) show that OLS estimation of an ADL specification yields numerical estimates 
of the long-run multipliers (k), hypothesis test statistics, and explanatory powers which are all identical 
to those of its corresponding ECM transform. 
50 See Banerjee, et al. (1993), Inder (1993), Hendry (1995), and Patterson (2000), which find negligible 
biases in the dynamic estimation of the long-run multipliers, even for small samples, and a substantial 
correction vis-à-vis the static model. The implication is that the lag specification should be “as general 
as the constraints of data and sample allow” (Banerjee, et al., 1993: 168).  QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS87   Page 21 
ADL is based on the null that the sum of the  ) ,..., 1 ( p i i = a in (3) is equal to 1.
51 
Monte Carlo simulations conducted by Banerjee, et al. (1993) show that the power of 
this t-test is higher than that of the residuals-based unit root test. 
 
c. Simultaneity. Hendry (1995) shows that the inclusion of dynamic terms in the ADL 
‘corrects’ for contemporaneity (i.e. one or some of the regressors are 




d. Failure of weak exogeneity. Weak exogeneity fails when the cointegrating 
relationship enters not only into the conditional model but also into the marginal 
process determining one or more of the variables upon which the model is 
conditioned. If this is the case, single-equation dynamic regressions lead to consistent 
but inefficient and biased estimates, and their t-statistics do not have asymptotically 
normal distributions. Monte Carlo experiments indicate that when weak exogeneity 
fails, the ADL estimator may be slightly biased in small samples. But, if 
contemporaneity is also present –as is often the case-, the adverse effects are very 
limited (Inder, 1993; Patterson, 2000). Moreover, the ADL estimator performs better 
than alternative single-equation estimators developed to deal with weak exogeneity 
failure, such as Philip and Hansen’s fully modified (FM) estimator, or Stock and 
Watson’s dynamic OLS (DOLS) estimator.
53 
 
Econometric estimation proceeds using Hendry’s general-to-specific modelling 
approach. One or two lags are chosen according to the number of regressors in the 
most general specification
54. If there is cointegration in the full model (with all lags), 
model reduction is carried out according to the Schwartz criterion and diagnostic 
tests. 
 
4.2 Data and sector classification 
 
The econometric analysis is based on annual data for the period 1970-99. Definition 
and data sources for variables are provided in Appendix 2. 
 
CR’s national accounts statistics are divided into ten industries. Industry classification 
was based on their  average level of tradability, regardless of the tradability of 
individual goods within them.  Two quantitative criteria were used: a) Tradedness: the 
ratio of the country’s actual trade values for the category of goods or s ervices 
produced by each industry relative to the industry’s value added). b) International 
arbitrage and cross-border price convergence, as measured by the co-movement 
                                                                 
51 For the dynamic model to converge to a long-run solution,￿ i a must be less than one.  
52 Moreover, Monte Carlo simulations suggest that small-sample biases of long-run estimators are 
almost negligible for single-equation dynamic OLS models when regressors are contemporaneous. 
Indeed, contemporaneity seems to have a beneficial impact on small-sample long-run parameter 
estimators (Patterson, 2000). 
53 Inder (1993) finds that the ADL estimator is less biased than the FM estimator, especially when the 
data generating process (DGP) is dynamic. Montalvo (1995) compares DOLS with other estimators. He 
does not include ADL, but since he uses Inder’s (1993) DGP, his results are fully comparable with 
those of Inder. It emerges that ADL performs much better than DOLS when weak exogeneity fails. 
54 ADL (2,2) general specifications were used for all regressions except those for investment and the 
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between traded and foreign good prices and an industry’s price deflators.
55 Co-
movements were assessed through simple correlation coefficients and regression 
analysis.  I classified agriculture (includes forestry, hunting, and fishing) and 
manufacturing (includes mining and quarrying) as tradable, and the remaining eight 





4.3.1 Output and growth 
 
Aggregate and sectoral production functions are specified as Cobb-Douglas and 
estimated in log-linear form: 
 
) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( 2 1 1 0 i LnFDIKst i LnKst i LnEmpl i LnY b b a a + + + =  , 
 
where i = aggregate, T or NT, LnEmpl is the log of employment (total number of 
employees), LnKst is the log of the fixed capital stock, and LnFDIKst is the log of the 
FDI capital stock. Variable definition and data sources are provided in Appendix 2. 
The FDI stock is used as a proxy for the stock of foreign-owned fixed capital, albeit 
the data on US foreign affiliates in CR and the investment regressions –discussed 
below- suggest that the FDI-fixed foreign investment relationship may not be strong 
in any sector. 
 
The production function results are shown in table A4. It emerges that FDIKst has a 
strong and highly statistically significant impact on long-run equilibrium output levels 
in both the aggregate production function and the T production function, while the 
fixed capital stock is not statistically significant. The impact of FDIKstNT on long-
run NT output, though positive and significant, is found to be very small (a coefficient 
of only 0.05).  
 
The results of the ECM model are similar. The impact effect of the stock of FDI on 
growth in aggregate output is substantial. But it is the result of dissimilar cases at the 
sectoral level. While a 1% increase in the rate of growth of the FDI stock results in a 
0.72% increase in T output growth, the stock of FDI in NT appears to have a 
negligible and not statistically significant impact on growth in that sector. In all cases, 
the error correction mechanism is highly significant, but speed of adjustment varies: 
from very low in the case of the NT sector (0.23% of any disequilibrium corrected in 
every period), to high for aggregate output (0.74%). And, in the case of T, there is 
actually “over-correction”: the coefficient on ECM is greater than 1. This is because 
the sum of the impact effects of all arguments in the T growth function is large and 
much greater than 1, meaning that the ECM must overcompensate so that T output 





                                                                 
55 For each of the industries, price deflators can be simply obtained by dividing current price value-
added by constant price value-added.  
56 The results of the tradability tests for sector classification are not presented, but may be obtained 
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4.3.2  Investment 
 
Based on the extensive literature on the determinants of private investment demand in 
developing countries
57, the aggregate and sectoral private gross fixed investment 
functions were specified to include the following potential explanatory elements:  
 
§ an ‘accelerator’ term (GDP, consumption)  
§ public investment 
§ changes in the stock of net domestic credit to the private sector 
§ cost of capital (including the real interest rate and the relative price of capital 
goods) 
§ macroeconomic instability measures (inflation level, volatility in prices, volatility 
in inflation) 
§ measures of potential financial crowding out by the public sector (such as credit to 
the public sector as a share of total credit, or changes in the stock of public 
domestic debt) 
§ the real exchange rate 
§ measures of foreign exchange availability (net resource transfers; non-FDI capital 
inflows to the non-financial private sector) 
§ FDI inflows     
      
Many different combinations were tested. It emerged that coefficients on most 
variables were not robust to specification, and many were very sensitive to the 
inclusion or exclusion of GDP. The results, shown in table A5, correspond to the runs 
where consumption was used as a proxy for the accelerator. Only the best performing 
variables in the different combinations were included in the final set of regressions.  
 
In line with the empirical literature, the two most robust explanatory variables in all 
alternative specifications, and in both long-run cointegrating solutions and ECMs, 
were consumption and domestic credit to the private sector.  The RER had the 
expected negative influence on long-run NT investment. However, it also had a 
negative, though not statistically significant, impact on private investment in T. This 
suggests that capital formation in T is not sensitive to relative price incentives, or 
alternatively, that a RER appreciation is a proxy for an improvement in the investment 
climate not sufficiently controlled for by the accelerator and FDI. Aggregate 
investment also responds negatively to the RER, not a surprising result given that NT 
private fixed investment accounted for over two thirds of private fixed capital 
formation during the sample period. FDI inflows were found to have no direct long-
run or short-run impact on private investment levels or their rate of growth, neither at 
the aggregate nor at the sectoral level. This could be interpreted as the result of three, 
not mutually exclusive, factors. a) Though FDI does exert a strong  indirect positive 
effect on investment through its large impact on output and growth, particularly in the 
T sector, econometrically the accelerator could be absorbing all or most of any 
positive effect. Indeed, the long-run and short-run elasticities of investment in all 
sectors with respect to the accelerator were found to be greater than one. This could 
be driving the coefficients of FDI downwards. However, dropping the accelerator 
terms, while resulting in larger positive coefficients for FDI, considerably worsened 
the fit and expanded standard errors, so that no significance was found for most 
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explanatory variables (except credit). b) FDI flows, as shown by the microeconomic 
evidence analysed in the last section, does not add one-to-one to fixed capital; a 
substantial fraction of it finances current assets. Thus, FDI is a poor proxy for gross 
fixed investment by foreign firms. c) A third possibility is, of course, that FDI crowds 
out domestic investment. The microeconomic data suggest that financial crowding out 
is not likely to be a major factor. On the other hand, they also indicate that linkages of 
foreign firms, especially those operating in the FTZ and TA regimes, with domestic 
suppliers are scant, so that direct complementarity between foreign and domestic 
investment is weak at best. Crowding out at product and labour markets can also 
explain the result. The former is unlikely to be large, given that most foreign 
investment in CR, a very small and open economy, is export-oriented rather than 
local-market oriented. Labour market crowding out, especially through an increase in 




In any event, the econometric evidence indicates that the hypothesis of input 
complementarity between foreign and domestic investment is not warranted.   
 
4.3.3 Exports and imports 
 
Export supply is specified as a function of domestic demand (with an expected 
negative sign); foreign demand (given by a geometric weighted average index of trade 
partners’ GDP); relative prices (either the price of exports relative to domestic goods, 
or the external REER  -as defined in Appendix 2 -, which measures international 
competitiveness); and total and sectoral FDI stocks. Results are shown in table A6 for 
the runs with the external RER
59. It emerges that domestic and foreign demand had 
the expected signs in the long-run regression with total FDI stock (regression 1), but 
the signs were reversed when sectoral FDI stocks were used (runs 2 and 4). The 
external REER, on the other hand, has the expected positive sign and was significant 
in all cases but one. The FDI stock, as expected, exerts a very strong and statistically 
significant impact on export levels and,  in particular, on their growth rate (the 
elasticity of export growth with respect to the total FDI stock is 2.18). Though much 
lower than that for the FDI stock in T, cumulative FDI in the NT sector has a 
considerable positive impact on exports. This suggests that FDI into industries 
classified as NT, such as wholesale trade, could be financing the operations of export 
trading firms. 
 
Import demand, in turn, is specified as a function of domestic demand; the relative 
prices of imports; exports (to account f or any possible foreign exchange constraint); 
and FDI inflows.
60 Results are displayed in table A7. All control variables had the 
expected signs and showed strong and statistically significant long-run and short-run 
                                                                 
58 Results for other variables are as follows. Public investment, while exhibiting a strong positive 
impact on investment in NT, had no explanatory power in the other two sets of regression. The real 
interest rate had always the expected sign, but is not statistically significant. It was only kept where its 
exclusion affected diagnostic tests or the Schwarz criterion. Instead, the relative price of capital goods, 
as expected, has a negative effect on long-run investment in all sectors (though not its rate of growth). 
Similarly, the volatility of producer prices was found to reduce aggregate and NT investment levels and 
rates of growth, but has no impact on fixed capital formation in T.  
59 The relative price of exports, though not always significant, had a negative sign. This suggests that 
exports are driven more by foreign demand and international competitiveness, than by relative 
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effects on imports. Aggregate and sectoral FDI inflows, also as expected, exert a 
positive impact on the long-run equilibrium levels of imports, although after 
controlling for the indirect impact through exports and GDP, the direct effects are 
small. FDIT shows a larger impact than FDINT, but its coefficient becomes negative 
(though still small) in the ECM model.  
 
Overall, the evidence suggests that the presence of foreign firms has a positive long-
run and short-run impact on exports and imports, regardless of the industry in which 
they operate.  
 
4.3.4  The real exchange rate 
 
The specification of the RER model was based on a combination of the theoretical 
and empirical literature on RER determination in developing countries
61, and our 
supply-side model of section II. The regressions, therefore, include conventional 




64, and non-FDI capital inflows. I also include two 
alternative measures of productivity growth differentials between T and NT sectors 
(to account for the Harrod-Balassa-Samuelson effect referred to above): the output 
growth differential, and the ratio of labour productivity indices for T and NT. Finally, 
the nominal exchange rate is used in both in long-run and short-run regressions. Two 
sets of regressions are estimated.  
 
In the first one, total FDI inflows and FDI net resource transfers –FDINRT- (i.e. FDI 
inflows minus total FDI income) are used alternatively, to account for the demand-
side effects of flows. It is expected that FDI inflows will have a stronger negative 
effect than FDINRT, as the latter considers FDI-related outflows on current account. 
For consistency, FDI is used along with other (non-FDI) capital inflows, and FDINRT 
with total net resource transfers excluding FDI (i.e. imports minus exports minus 
FDINRT). The results are shown in tables A8 and A9. The government 
expenditure/GDP ratio and trade policies had the expected signs (except for implicit 
tariffs in regression 3 of table A9) and are fairly robust to specification, but implicit 
tariffs produces better results than openness (although the two are very closely –
negatively- correlated). The terms of trade, in turn, have very erratic coefficients. The 
two measures of sectoral productivity differentials exert the expected negative impact 
on the RER, both in the long-run and in the ECM model, but while coefficients on 
growth differentials are almost always statistically significant (they are in the short-
run), labour productivity differentials are not significant in any  of the chosen 
specifications. The nominal exchange rate has, as expected, no substantial impact on 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
60 FDI stocks were also used, but produced serious problems of serial correlation and non-normality of 
residuals.  
61 See, for instance, Edwards (1989), Elbadawi (1994), and Baffes, et al. (1999). 
62 A positive terms of trade shock increases national income, and triggers a spending effect that 
appreciates the RER. But the income effect could be overcome by substitution effects on the demand 
and supply sides. The net impact is therefore ambiguous. 
63 Public expenditure is expected to be tilted towards NT goods, and thus to have a negative effect on 
the RER. 
64 Tighter trade policies compress imports. To restore equilibrium, the RER will tend to appreciate. We 
use to alternative measures of trade policies: openness (exports plus imports/GDP), expected to have a 
positive sign, and implicit tariffs (ratio of total tariff revenues to total imports), with an expected 
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the long-run RER, although it does exert a positive effect in the short run. When total 
FDI flows are used, other capital inflows have no discernible influence over the 
equilibrium RER or its short-run adjustment. But the FDI/GDP ratio does have a 
strong and highly statistically significant negative impact on the long-run equilibrium 
level of the RER and on its short-run evolution.
65 By contrast, FDINRT has –as 
expected- no significant long-run real appreciation effect, and seems moreover to 
have a positive impact on RER changes, while other net resource transfers do carry 
negative (and statistically significantly so in most cases) long-run and impact 
coefficients.  
 
In the second set of specifications, I used sectoral FDI/Y ratios, to account more 
clearly for the potential supply-side effects of foreign fixed capital investment on the 
RER, as developed in the model.
66 The same control variables are used, and as shown 
in table A10, their coefficients are mostly robust.
67 As expected, FDIT has a 
statistically significant negative impact on the equilibrium RER, and on its rate of 
change. The effect is much stronger than that of the non-FDI net resource transfer 
ratio. On the other hand, FDI inflows to the NT sector have a statistically significant 
negative impact on the equilibrium RER, and indeed a slightly higher coefficient than 
that on FDIT. In the short-run, however, FDINT does not have a distinct impact on 
the RER. 
 
To analyse the results of the FDI coefficients in the RER regressions requires 
integrating the theoretical insights of the model of section II, with the empirical 
evidence of sections III and IV. This is carried out in the next section. 
 
V. Macroeconomic adjustment to FDI inflows: Integrating theory and evidence 
 
The RER acts as a summary indicator of the macroeconomic adjustment mechanisms 
taking place to absorb a foreign capital inflow. If FDI has a statistically significant 
negative impact on the equilibrium RER, it indicates that, in the long run, FDI flows 
contribute to generate excess aggregate demand for NT goods. How is this result 
brought about? I will approach the analysis from two different, but complementary 
perspectives.  
 
§ An examination of the balance-of-payments effects of foreign-owned firms in CR, 
based on the evidence on their capital and current account transactions. This is 
intended to determine whether there is indeed a net positive foreign exchange 
effect of FDI, and therefore whether a transfer process is required at all 
§ A dynamic analysis of the impact of FDI on relative demand for and supply of NT 
goods, as a means of explaining how the transfer is effected.  
                                                                 
65 Notice, however, that the size of the FDI/GDP coefficient varies substantially between regression 1 
and regressions 2 and 3. 
66 Moreover, the sectoral FDI/GDP ratios are measured as ratios of real variables, where both FDIT and 
FDINT were deflated using the implicit investment deflator. This is consistent with the use of sectoral 
FDI as a proxy for sectoral foreign investment. By contrast, the total FDI/GDP ratio in tables A8 and 
A9 was defined as a ratio of variables in current prices.  
67 There are two exceptions: the terms of trade and the nominal exchange rate. In the regressions 
reported in table A10, the former exert a statistically significant negative long-run real appreciation 
effect, but a positive one in the short-run. Thus, contrary to theoretical expectations, substitution effects 
of terms of trade shocks seem to have a stronger RER impact in the short run, while in the long-run the 
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I argue that the finding of a long-run RER appreciation effect of FDI is consistent 
with what the theory and evidence, seen from those two standpoints, would predict.    
 
5.1 Balance-of-payments effects 
 
An analysis of cross-border resource flows suggests that, if the total balance-of-
payments effects of foreign-owned firms operating in CR are positive, there has to be 
a RER appreciation in order to restore external balance.
68 Here, external balance is 
understood as a zero-overall-balance-of-payments condition, as opposed to the 
standard notion of external balance as meaning a zero-current-account. In my view, an 
economy can permanently run a current account deficit based on a surplus of FDI 
flows because –as stated above- they are non-debt creating. But it cannot permanently 
run an overall balance-of-payments surplus. Accumulation of reserves through 
sterilised intervention is both expensive  –because of the interest rate differentials 
between domestic and foreign bonds- and self-defeating, because upward interest-rate 
pressures from the placement of sterilising bonds in domestic  credit markets 
contribute to attract further capital inflows. Therefore, an excess supply of foreign 
exchange will eventually generate the RER appreciation required to absorb it.  
 
The overview of aggregate FDI-related flows shows that FDI generates positive and 
large net resource transfers, although, as expected, their impact on the RER is much 
lower than that of total FDI inflows. However, this analysis is incomplete. Foreign 
firms engage in many transactions on current account not linked to FDI by the 
balance-of-payments accounting procedures. Thus, payments of interest, royalties and 
other fees, and the net export balance of their operations, is not considered in our 
measure of FDINRT. But the BEA data set shows that, at least in the case of US 
MOFAs, their total balance-of-payments impact is large and positive. This is 
complemented by the results from the econometric analysis of exports and imports. 
Although the FDI coefficients are not fully comparable, because we use stocks for 
exports and flows for imports, it appears that the impact of FDI on exports is larger 
than that on imports. If this is indeed the case, the total impact of FDI on net exports 
should be positive. This would add to the RER appreciation effect of FDI.          
 
5.2 Intra-temporal and inter-temporal supply and demand effects 
 
The model of section II anticipates an unambiguous appreciation impact of FDIT on 
the equilibrium RER. This is because of both a direct demand effect, and an inter-
temporal supply (Harrod-Balassa-Samuelson) effect. The demand effect could be 
weakened or reversed if there is substantial financial crowding out. There is no 
evidence that foreign-owned firms borrow significantly in the CR credit markets. On 
the other hand, the supply effect of FDIT –its strong impact on output and growth in 
T- has a second round positive impact on the demand for NT goods, via increases in 
disposable income. This, in our view, is the main driver of the RER appreciation 
effect of FDIT. However, it is interesting that this effect remains strong even when 
controlling for growth differentials across sectors. Finally, the fact that FDIT does not 
exert a positive impact on fixed investment in T implies that a second mechanism 
                                                                 
68 Of course, the net positive effects could be matched –and undone- by capital outflows, without a 
need for relative price adjustment. But there is no strong reason to presume that net FDI inflows should 
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through which FDIT could appreciate the RER  –a displacement of domestic fixed 
investment from NT towards T- is not present.  
 
In the case of FDINT, its effect on the RER is predicted to be ambiguous, and 
contingent on the relative sizes of the demand and supply effects, which work in 
opposite directions. However, the econometric evidence indicates that FDINT’s 
impact on NT output and its rate of growth is immaterial, and is further weakened by 
the fact that FDINT does not contribute to fixed investment in NT. Thus, the demand 
(RER appreciating) effect of FDINT should be expected to prevail. The fact that the 
negative RER impact of FDINT is larger than that of FDIT is, nevertheless, 
unanticipated. It suggests that the direct demand   effect of FDINT is stronger than the 
demand and supply effects of FDIT put together. This could be the case if the NT-
intensity of foreign firms operating in NT industries (e.g. hotels, restaurants, banks) is 
much higher than that of foreign firms in T, a reasonable scenario.   
 
Finally, it is not surprising that the RER impact of total FDI inflows should be 




This paper has argued that a study of the process of macroeconomic adjustment to a 
net inflow of FDI –the transfer process- should not be detached from an investigation 
into the trade and financial practices of the foreign-owned firms towards which FDI 
flows. Analysis of such practices is necessary for an understanding of the overall 
balance-of-payments effect of foreign firms’ operations, and of the interactions 
between FDI, foreign fixed investment, and domestic fixed capital formation. The 
study of direct balance-of-payments effects provides a useful perspective on whether 
and to what extent absorption of FDI flows requires a relative price adjustment.  
 
On the other hand, the link between FDI and foreign fixed investment, and therefore, 
between FDI and output, is crucial for the explanation of how such adjustment is 
effected. But usually this link is either ignored -in the literature on the macroeconomic 
impact of capital inflows- or assumed to be perfect –in the literature on the growth or 
investment impact of FDI-. Of course, neither procedure is warranted. FDI could 
finance the accumulation of current assets, or the purchase of existing fixed assets. 
But fixed investment by other firms could also be financed by other means, and the 
empirical literature suggests that host country borrowing is often one of them. 
Nevertheless, however poor, there is a connection between FDI and the production 
functions of recipient firms in different sectors.  
 
The model developed in this paper integrates some of these elements into the 
explanation of RER equilibrium determination in the presence of FDI and foreign-
owned capital. Its main implication is that the impact of FDI on the equilibrium RER 
depends on both direct demand mechanisms and inter-temporal supply channels. In 
particular, it shows that FDI into the T sector unambiguously appreciates the RER, 
whereas the impact of FDINT is not determined a priori. It also indicates that the 
extent of host country borrowing and the NT-intensity of foreign firms’ operations are 
major explanatory factors of the RER impact of FDI.  
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The major empirical findings of the paper are: 
 
§ FDI inflows to CR have increased dramatically after 1986. While the share of 
FDINT grew markedly in the 1990s, it is still relatively small. Most of the stock 
of FDI is in the T sector.  
§ Foreign affiliates do not appear to resort to much host-country borrowing to 
finance their operations. Instead, related-company financing is central. 
§ Only a small fraction of FDI appears to finance fixed investment in the case of US 
MOFAs. The rest finances current assets. If this pattern is extrapolated to the 
country as a whole, it could explain the fact that FDI does not have a discernible 
econometric effect on aggregate or sectoral private fixed investment.  
§ FDI has a large negative impact on the RER, although the RER appreciation effect 
weakens when only FDI-related net resource transfers are considered. As 
expected, FDIT exerts a strong negative impact on the RER. But so does FDINT, 
and its coefficient is in fact slightly larger than that of FDIT. 
§ From a static, balance-of-payments perspective, the negative impact of FDI on the 
RER is associated with the evidence that f oreign firms seem to have a positive 
overall balance-of-payments effect. Indeed, retained earnings and distributed 
profits have remained at low levels relative to total FDI inflows to CR, so that the 
net resource transfers associated with FDI have been very large. If retained 
earnings are excluded, the cost of FDI (profit repatriations and other payments on 
current account) is low relative to the stock of FDI for US foreign affiliates. The 
foreign-owned firms operating in CR have high import and export propensities, 
and for the firms in FTZ and TA regimes, statistically significantly higher than 
domestic firms. The econometric impact of FDI on exports and imports is 
positive, but it appears that the former is larger, so that the effect on net exports is 
also positive. Finally, the total direct balance-of-payments effect of US MOFAs is 
large and has increased substantially.  
§ The RER appreciation effect of FDIT is associated with the supply channel: the 
strong coefficient of FDIT in the T production functions, both in the long-run 
levels and the growth regressions. But there is no discernible impact of FDIT on 
fixed investment in the T sector. In the case of FDINT, there is no major supply-
side effect, neither directly through the production function, nor indirectly 
through domestic fixed investment. Hence its negative effect on the RER. But the 
fact that its impact is larger than that of FDIT suggests that the direct demand 
channel (purchases of NT goods) must be very large for FDINT.  
 
The findings of this paper suggest areas for potential further research. In particular, 
two issues appear to be of central importance: an analysis of the factors explaining the 
lack of a direct fixed investment effect of FDI (other than through the accelerator 
channel), and a consideration of the impact of FDI on real wages. Indeed, the latter –a 
labour market crowding out effect- could be a contributing factor behind the 
investment function results.  
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Table A1. US MOFAs in CR: FDI and other Balance of Payments Data 
Selected years (1982-1998) 
(in millions of current US$, where applicable) 
 
  FDI 
Stock 












Balance of payments 
effects 
  (A)  Total  Reinves-
ted 
earnings 






1998  2,080  599  -97  -16.19%  -79  20  -2.84%  1,244  1,902 
1997  1,580  316  245  77.53%  252  21  17.28%  1,535  1,578 
1996  1,284  362  302  83.43%  307  9  24.61%  1,441  1,487 
1995  921  271  334  123.25%  343  8  38.11%  1,291  1,211 
1990  251  43  31  72.09%  41  3  17.53%  122  121 
1985  123  -32  -7  21.88%  2  8  8.13%  N/A  N/A 
1982  142  0  4  N/A  10  1  7.75%  N/A  N/A 
1/ Includes parents’ claims on the earnings of the affiliates (whether retained or distributed) as well as 
parents’ net interest receipts on loans to the affiliates, net of withholding taxes.  
2/ Includes net payments of royalties, license fees and other charges for services from the affiliates to 
their parents, net of withholding taxes. 
3/Total exports minus imports from the US 
4/Trade balance + FDI inflows – FDI income – Net service payments to parents on current account 
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Table A2. Trade and financial patterns of domestic and foreign-owned firms in the FTZ 
and TA regimes: Summary of ANOVA tests (1998) 
 
    FTZ regime  Temporary Admission regime 
    Costa Rican  Foreign-owned  Costa Rican  Foreign-owned 
           
Group mean  0.8977  0.9567  0.8  0.98  Export ratio
1 
p-value  0.1701  0.00183** 
Group mean  0.6255  0.8148  0.56  0.74  Import ratio
2 
p-value  0.0525
+  0.23336 
Group mean  0.3889  0.7679  0.53  0.66  Input import ratio
3 
p-value  0.0001**  0.39014 
Group mean  0.3139  0.6779  0.28  0.75  Related-party fin. 1
4 
p-value  0.002**  0.00051** 
Group mean  0.0473  0.3064  0.16  0.5  Related-party fin. 2
5 
p-value  0.0369*  0.09843
+ 
Group mean  0.975  0.4424  0.9  0.57  Local borrowing 1
6 
p-value  0.0067**  0.08149
+ 
Group mean  0.3002  0.0191  0.24  0.01  Local borrowing 2
7 
p-value  0.00000001**  0.00002** 
Notes: The null hypothesis in the ANOVA tests is that between-group means are equal. 
+: significant at 
the 10% level; *: significant at the 5% level; **: significant at the 1% level 
1/Exports/Total sales 
2/Total imports (inputs + machinery and equipment)/Total purchases 
3/Input imports/Total input purchases 
4/ Non-financial long-term liabilities/(Total financial liabilities + non-financial long-term liabilities) 
5/ Non-financial long-term liabilities/Total assets  
6/ Local bank liabilities/Total financial liabilities 
7/ Local bank liabilities/Total liabilities 




Table A.3. US MOFAs in CR: Trade and financial patterns 
Selected years (1989-1998) 
 




















1998  0.6997  6.1458  0.9625  0.2535  0.7058  2.2268 
1997  0.7601  3.1005  0.3447  0.3208  0.5363  5.1803 
1996  0.7608  2.7414  0.2569  0.3240  0.5000  7.3878 
1995  0.7438  2.4922  0.2625  0.4545  0.4029  2.8526 
1994  0.7275  2.6481  0.2803  0.4737  0.2875  3.4035 
1990  0.3784  1.1829  0.4857  0.6920  0.5020  N/A 
1989  0.5511  1.8558  0.4093  0.6008  0.4049  N/A 
Source: Author’s own calculations, with data from Bureau of Economic Analysis, US 
Department of Commerce 
 
 





Table A4. Aggregate and sectoral production functions: Long-run cointegrating 
solutions to a reduced ADL (2,2) model and corresponding ECM regressions, 1970-99 
 
Long-run cointegrating solutions  Total short-run impact (ECM model) 
Dependent variable: LnY(i)   Dependent variable: DLnY(i) 
i=   Total  T  NT  i=  Total  T  NT 
  (1)  (2)  (3)    (4)  (5)  (6) 
Constant  --  3.199**  --  Constant  --  --  0.018* 
    (0.875)          (0.009) 
LnEmpl(i)  0.467**  0.066  0.374**  DLnEmpl(i)  0.464**  0.502*  -0.015 
  (0.061)  (0.084)  (0.057)    (0.148)  (0.204)  (0.182) 
LnKst(i)   0.038  0.025  0.366**  DLnKst(i)   0.846**  0.953**  0.666** 
  (0.164)  (0.065)  (0.082)    (0.262)  (0.259)  (0.169) 
LnFDIKst(i)   0.299**  0.498**  0.052*  DLnFDIKst(i)  0.266*  0.715**  0.032 
  (0.1)  (0.061)  (0.02)    (0.134)  (0.137)  (0.041) 
dummy1982  -0.145**  -0.139**  -0.253**  dummy1982  -0.143**  -0.175**  -0.084** 
  (0.041)  (0.037)  (0.089)    (0.023)  (0.046)  (0.014) 
        ECM_1  -0.744**  -1.36**  -0.231** 
          (0.164)  (0.318)  (0.07) 
R2  0.999  0.995  0.999  R2  0.909  0.901  0.808 
AR 1-2  0.565  0.129  0.629  AR 1-2  0.2  0.518  0.48 
ARCH 1   0.985  0.794  0.975  ARCH 1   0.482  0.831  0.813 
Normality  0.991  0.282  0.554  Normality  0.722  0.265  0.309 
Heteroscedast.  0.574  0.806  0.883  Heteroscedast.  0.901  0.929  0.941 
RESET  0.824  0.271  0.965  RESET  0.086  0.744  0.404 
Cointegration  -5.023*  -5.54**  -3.187†         
* (**) denotes statistically significant at the 5% (1%) level. 
† The ADF statistic for the cointegration test on the residuals is –5.87. The null of no cointegration is 
rejected at the 1% level using appropriate critical values (see Banerjee, 1993: 213). 
Notes: Long-run solutions were obtained using PcGive 9.30. Numbers in brackets are standard errors. 
Diagnostic tests: all numbers provided are p-values; AR 1 -2 is a Breusch-Godfrey LM test for serial 
autocorrelation up to the second lag; ARCH is a test for autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity 
up to the first lag; Normality is the Doornik-Hansen test for the normality of the residuals; 
Heteroscedast. is White’s test for heteroscedasticity; RESET is Ramsey’s general test of 
misspecification. Cointegration test: It is a t-test of the null of no cointegration, based on whether the 
coefficient on the lagged dependent variable is statistically significantly less than one. Data definition 
and sources: See Appendix 2  





Table A5. Aggregate and sectoral investment demand functions: Long-run cointegrating 
solutions to a reduced ADL (1,1) model and corresponding ECM regressions, 1970-99 
 
Long-run cointegrating solutions  Total short-run impact (ECM model) 
Dependent variable: LnIpri(i)   Dependent variable: DLnIpri(i) 
i=   Total  T  NT  i=  Total  T  NT 
  (1)  (2)  (3)    (4)  (5)  (6) 
Constant  --  --  --  Constant  --  --  -- 
               
LnConPr  1.407**  1.545**  1.111**  DLnConPr  1.75**  1.244**  1.502** 
  (0.089)  (0.186)  (0.084)    (0.205)  (0.387)  (0.198) 
LnIpub  --  --  0.253**  DLnIpub  --  --  0.301** 
      (0.049)        (0.068) 
DCredPr(i)  0.109**  0.547*  0.127*  DDCredPr(i)  0.102**  0.481**  0.096* 
  (0.034)  (0.264)  (0.06)    (0.021)  (0.124)  (0.046) 
RIntR(i)  --  --  -0.124  DRIntR(i)  --  -0.329  -- 
      (0.154)      (0.199)   
Ln(Pk/P)  -0.638**  -1.269**  -0.467**  DLn(Pk/P)  --  --  -- 
  (0.126)  (0.296)  (0.145)         
LnPvolat  -0.133**  --  -0.079*  DLnPvolat  -0.139**  --  -0.083** 
  (0.028)    (0.029)    (0.029)    (0.025) 
LIRERPRO  -0.662**  -0.387  -0.499**  DLIRERPRO  --  0.104  -- 
  (0.153)  (0.331)  (0.103)      (0.406)   
LnFDI(i)  0.004  0.078  0.004  DLnFDI(i)  0.052  0.093  0.002 
  (0.037)  (0.093)  (0.004)    (0.037)  (0.065)  (0.003) 
        ECM_1  -0.927**  -0.489**  -0.819** 
          (0.172)  (0.145)  (0.185) 
R2  0.999  0.999  0.999  R2  0.88  0.712  0.999 
AR 1-2  0.668  0.896  0.87  AR 1-2  0.759  0.482  0.898 
ARCH 1   0.75  0.966  0.116  ARCH 1   0.729  0.885  0.385 
Normality  0.866  0.974  0.904  Normality  0.712  0.263  0.952 
Heteroscedast.  0.957  0.601  --  Heteroscedast.  0.976  0.921  0.876 
RESET  0.129  0.622  0.785  RESET  0.598  0.899  0.234 
Cointegration  -7.652**  -3.876†  -6.809**         
* (**) denotes statistically significant at the 5% (1%) level. 
† The ADF statistic for the cointegration test on the residuals is -4.872. The null of no cointegration is 
rejected at the 5% level using appropriate critical values (see Banerjee, 1993: 213). 
Notes: Long-run solutions were obtained using PcGive 9.30. Numbers in brackets are standard errors. 
Diagnostic tests: all numbers provided are p-values; see table A4 for description of diagnostic tests. 
Data definition and sources: See Appendix 2 




Table A6. Export supply function: Long-run cointegrating solutions to a reduced ADL 
(2,2) model and corresponding ECM regressions, 1970-99 
 
Long-run cointegrating solutions  Total short-run impact from ECM 
Dependent variable: LnX  Dependent variable: DLnX 
  (1)  (2)    (3)  (4) 
Constant  --  --  Constant  --  -- 
           
LnY  -0.789**  1.987**  DLnY  1.017**  1.998** 
  (0.242)  (0.466)    (0.287)  (0.307) 
LnY*  2.15*  -0.571**  DLnY*  0.241  -0.721 
  (0.995)  (0.127)    (0.425)  (0.369) 
LnExtREER  0.084  0.188**  DLnExtREER  0.191*  0.285** 
  (0.12)  (0.054)    (0.084)  (0.054) 
LnFDIKst  0.696*  --  DLnFDIKst  2.184**  -- 
  (0.263)      (0.358)   
LnFDIKstT  --  0.318*  DLnFDIKstT  --  1.272** 
    (0.139)      (0.226) 
LnFDIKstNT  --  0.244**  DLnFDIKstNT  --  0.648** 
    (0.034)      (0.087) 
      ECM_1  -0.639**  -1.038** 
        (0.103)  (0.129) 
R2  0.999  0.999  R2  0.892  0.963 
AR 1-2  0.934  0.983  AR 1-2  0.217  0.672 
ARCH 1   0.389  0.15  ARCH 1   0.308  0.339 
Normality  0.144  0.298  Normality  0.151  0.164 
Heterosc edast.  0.749  --  Heteroscedast.  0.984  0.995 
RESET  0.74  0.066  RESET  0.469  0.496 
Cointegration  -4.681*  -8.543**       
* (**) denotes statistically significant at the 5% (1%) level. 
Notes: Long-run solutions were obtained using  PcGive 9.30.  Numbers in brackets are 
standard errors.  Diagnostic tests:  all numbers provided are p -values; see table A4 for 
description of diagnostic tests. Data definition and sources: See Appendix 2 





Table A7. Import demand function: Long-run cointegrating solutions to a reduced ADL 
(2,2) model and corresponding ECM regressions, 1970-99 
 
Long-run cointegrating solutions  ECM (total short-run impact) 
Dependent variable: LnM  Dependent variable: DLnM  
  (1)  (2)      (3)  (4)   
Constant  2.015**  --    Constant  --  --   
  (0.627)             
LnY  0.655**  0.921**    DLnY  0.515*  0.667**   
  (0.098)  (0.058)      (0.255)  (0.214)   
Ln(Pm/Pd)  -0.679**  -0.58**    DLn(Pm/Pd)  -0.484**  -0.441**   
  (0.063)  (0.047)      (0.096)  (0.07)   
LnX  0.336**  0.241**    DLnX  0.259*  0.481**   
  (0.059)  (0.041)      (0.108)  (0.112)   
LnFDI  0.11**  --    DLnFDI  0.086**  --   
  (0.025)        (0.024)     
LnFDIT  --  0.085**    DLnFDIT  --  -0.047**   
    (0.018)        (0.017)   
LnFDINT  --  0.012**    DLnFDINT  --  0.013**   
    (0.003)        (0.003)   
        ECM_1  -0.477**  -0.552**   
          (0.137)  (0.114)   
R2  0.996  0.999    R2  0.921  0.963   
AR 1-2  0.096  0.58    AR 1-2  0.272  0.46   
ARCH 1   0.847  0.304    ARCH 1   0.204  0.51   
Normality  0.637  0.92    Normality  0.634  0.118   
Heteroscedast.  0.956  0.73    Heteroscedast.  0.895  --   
RESET  0.69  0.839    RESET  0.64  0.466   
Cointegration  -12.641**  -9.07**           
* (**) denotes statistically significant at the 5% (1%) level. 
Notes: Long-run solutions were obtained using PcGive 9.30. Numbers in brackets are standard errors. 
Diagnostic tests: all numbers provided are p-values; see table A4 for description of diagnostic tests. 
Data definition and sources: See Appendix 2 
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Table A8. Real exchange rate determination using FDI and FDINRT: Long-run 
cointegrating solutions to a reduced ADL (1,1) model, 1970-99 
 
  Dependent variable: LIRERPRO 
               
  With FDI/Y    With FDINRT/Y 
  (1)  (2)  (3)    (4)  (5)  (6) 
Constant  2.225**  3.799*  4.578**    2.853*  4.959**  5.125** 
  (0.704)  (1.078)  (0.778)    (1.141)  (1.542)  (1.52) 
Ln(Gov/Y)  -0.77**  -0.702**  -0.821**    -0.692**  -0.366  -0.095 
  (0.104)  (0.18)  (0.153)    (0.214)  (0.298)  (0.27) 
LnImplTariff  -0.132**  --  -0.219**    -0.134**  --  -0.175* 
  (0.022)    (0.052)    (0.041)    (0.085) 
LnOPEN  --  1.084**  --    --  0.779  -- 
    (0.327)        (0.455)   
LnToT  0.138  0.047  -0.422**    0.061  -0.063  -0.214 
  (0.129)  (0.226)  (0.147)    (0.184)  (0.311)  (0.243) 
GrowthdiffTNT  -0.646**  -0.19  --    -1.121*  -1.555  -- 
  (0.258)  (0.469)      (0.405)  (0.919)   
LnLabprodTNT  --  --  -0.094    --  --  -0.488 
      (0.185)        (0.292) 
LnNER  0.006  -0.052*  0.037*    -0.034*  -0.0231  -0.039 
  (0.009)  (0.0253)  (0.016)    (0.014)  (0.047)  (0.032) 
NKF(exclFDI)/Y  0.406  0.028  -0.596    --  --  -- 
  (0.283)  (0.548)  (0.432)         
NRT(exclFDI)/Y  --  --  --    -0.861  -2.239*  -3.274** 
          (0.633)  (1.005)  (0.801) 
FDI/Y  -3.379**  -9.574**  -10.13**    --  --  -- 
  (0.979)  (2.645)  (1.644)         
FDINRT/Y  --  --  --    -2.83  -5.378  0.118 
          (1.864)  (3.702)  (0.801) 
R2  0.978  0.976  0.926    0.969  0.965  0.895 
AR 1-2  0.491  0.228  0.224    0.094  0.125  0.969 
ARCH 1   0.473  0.681  0.347    0.916  0.934  0.409 
Normality  0.525  0.31  0.10    0.283  0.256  0.396 
Heteroscedast.  --  --  0.831    --  --  0.926 
RESET  0.343  0.091  0.268    0.085  0.077  0.332 
Cointegration  -7.152**  -5.116*  -6.519**    -6.207**  -3.449  -4.701* 
* (**) denotes statistically significant at the 5% (1%) level. 
Notes: Long-run solutions were obtained using PcGive 9.30. Numbers in brackets are standard 
errors.  Diagnostic tests:  all numbers provided are p-values; see table A4 for description of 
diagnostic tests. Data definition and sources: See Appendix 2 
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Table A9. Real exchange rate determination using FDI and FDINRT: Total short-run 
impact coefficients from the error-correction models, 1971-99 
 
  Dependent variable: DLIRERPRO 
           
  With D(FDI/Y)    With D(FDINRT/Y) 
  (1)1  (2) 2    (3) 3  (4) 4 
Constant  --  -0.011    --  -- 
    (0.007)       
DLn(Gov/Y)  -0.508**  -0.445**    -0.269**  -0.407** 
  (0.068)  (0.12)    (0.066)  (0.126) 
DLnImplTariff  -0.001  -0.103**    0.018  -0.033 
  (0.002)  (0.022)    (0.021)  (0.027) 
DLToT  0.29**  0.17*    0.191**  -0.115 
  (0.038)  (0.06)    (0.045)  (0.073) 
DGrowthdiffTNT  -0.336**  --    -0.221**  -- 
  (0.077)      (0.079)   
DLnLabprodTNT  --  -0.054    --  -0.209 
    (0.078)      (0.107) 
DLnNER  0.217**  0.108**    0.256**  0.047 
  (0.022)  (0.036)    (0.031)  (0.031) 
D(NKF(exclFDI)/Y)  0.085  -0.165    --  -- 
  (0.093)  (0.129)       
D(NRT(exclFDI)/Y)  --  --    -0.076  -0.759** 
        (0.123)  (0.212) 
D(FDI/Y)  -1.678**  -3.889**    --  -- 
  (0.511)  (0.823)       
D(FDINRT/Y)  --  --    1.258*  0.229 
        (0.397)  (0.262) 
ECM_1  -0.495**  -0.39**    -0.43**  -0.288** 
  (0.053)  (0.073)    (0.048)  (0.071) 
R2  0.953  0.915    0.961  0.843 
AR 1-2  0.854  0.619    0.838  0.772 
ARCH 1   0.73  0.395    0.715  0.998 
Normality  0.498  0.447    0.289  0.712 
Heteroscedast.  0.576  0.996    --  0.844 
RESET  0.39  0.42    0.639  0.531 
* (**) denotes statistically significant at the 5% (1%) level. 
1Corresponds to regression 1 in Table 1 
2Corresponds to regression 3 in Table 1 
3Corresponds to regression 4 in Table 1 
4Corresponds to regression 6 in Table 1 
Notes: Long-run solutions were obtained using PcGive 9.30. Numbers in brackets are 
standard errors. Diagnostic tests: all numbers provided are p-values; see table A4 for 
description of diagnostic tests. Data definition and sources: See Appendix 2 




Table A10. Real exchange rate determination using sectoral FDI: Long-run 
cointegrating solutions to a reduced ADL (1,1) model and corresponding ECM 
regressions, 1970-99 
 
Long-run cointegrating solutions  Total short-run impact from ECM 
Dependent variable: LIRERPRO  Dependent variable: DLIRERPRO 
  (1)  (2)    (3)  (4) 
Constant  4.81**  4.865**  Constant  --  0.017 
  (0.461)  (0.563)      (0.01) 
Ln(Gov/Y)  -0.415**  -0.346*  DLn(Gov/Y)  -0.305**  -0.532** 
  (0.113)  (0.122)    (0.061)  (0.142) 
LnImplTariff  -0.151**  -0.14**  DLnImplTariff  -0.096**  -0.072** 
  (0.026)  (0.031)    (0.017)  (0.02) 
LnToT  -0.261**  -0.238*  DLToT  0.137**  0.144* 
  (0.09)  (0.106)    (0.047)  (0.054) 
GrowthdiffTNT  -0.638*  --  DGrowthdiffTNT  -0.167*  -- 
  (0.295)      (0.081)   
LnLabprodTNT  --  -0.034  DLnLabprodTNT  --  -0.13 
    (0.151)      (0.073) 
LnNER  0.01  0.004  DLnNER  0.017  -0.06 
  (0.011)  (0.015)    (0.018)  (0.05) 
NRT(exclFDI)/Y  -1.361**  -1.459  D(NRT(exclFDI)/Y)  -0.555**  -0.759** 
  (0.294)  (0.343)    (0.121)  (0.167) 
FDIT/Y  -6.185**  -5.544**  D(FDIT/Y)  -3.936**  -3.456** 
  (1.105)  (1.198)    (0.552)  (0.547) 
FDINT/Y  -7.548*  -6.712*  D(FDINT/Y)  0.955  -2.047 
  (2.544)  (2.947)    (1.449)  (1.207) 
      ECM_1  -0.613**  -0.619** 
        (0.07)  (0.085) 
R2  0.969  0.961  R2  0.957  0.961 
AR 1-2  0.655  0.333  AR 1-2  0.612  0.749 
ARCH 1   0.191  0.225  ARCH 1   0.485  0.396 
Normality  0.662  0.318  Normality  0.615  0.213 
Heteroscedast.  --  --  Heteroscedast.  --  -- 
RESET  0.245  0.324  RESET  0.965  0.477 
Cointegration  -10.431**  -9.236**       
* (**) denotes statistically significant at the 5% (1%) level. 
Notes: Long-run solutions were obtained using  PcGive 9.30.  Numbers in brackets are 
standard errors.  Diagnostic tests:  all numbers provided are p -values; see table A4 for 
description of diagnostic tests. Data definition and sources: See Appendix 2 
 




Variable definitions and data sources 
 
General notes and notation: 
 
§ Prefix Ln or L denotes the natural logarithm of a variable 
§ D denotes first differences 
§ Total refers to country total 
§ T refers to the tradable sector, calculated in every case as the sum of agriculture 
(including forestry, hunting and fishing) and manufacturing (including mining and 
quarrying) 
§ NT refers to the nontradable sector, constructed in every case (except FDI) as the 
sum of wholesale and retail trade, restaurants, and hotels, general government 
services, electricity and water, construction (construction), transport, storage, and 
communications (transport), finance, insurance, and business services (finance), 
real estate services, and other personal services. For FDI, apart from agriculture 
and manufacturing, there are only series for “commerce” (wholesale and retail 
trade, restaurants and hotels) and “other services”. These two categories are added 
up and used as NT for FDI.  
§ ECM_1 is the first lag of the error-correction mechanism 
§ BCCR: Central Bank of Costa Rica 
 
Unless otherwise indicated, the source for all data is BCCR. Variables are listed in the order 




Y (Total, T, NT): Real GDP per sector, in millions of 1966 colones.  
 
Empl (Total, T, NT): Total number of workers employed in the sector. The Costa Rican 
Central Bank (BCCR) publishes data on employment only from 1976 onwards. To extend the 
series back to 1970, World Bank World Development Indicators figures for the total labour 
force are used. It is assumed that the rate of unemployment remains constant, so that 
variations in total labour force are translated directly into variations in employment. Also, 
employment per sector is extended by keeping the 1976 sectoral shares constant.   
 
Kst (Total, T, NT): Total fixed capital stock per sector, in millions of 1966 colones. Figures 
for the aggregate and capital stocks per industry for the period 1976-1992 are taken from a 
series constructed and published by the BCCR. The stocks were constructed by the BCCR 
through a careful study of capital composition in each sector, so that different depreciation 
rates could be applied accordingly (for a detailed explanation on the methodologies used, see 
Azofeifa, 1990). (Depreciation rates for buildings and premises are much lower than those for 
machinery and equipment, and for the latter there is a wide range of rates). To accumulate 
capital, the BCCR used the following formula:  
1 1 ) 1 ( + + + - = t t t I K K d      (1),  
where d is the rate of depreciation. In order to extend the series back and forward to complete 
values for 1969-1999, I proceeded as follows. First, by using the gross fixed investment series 
per sector, and solving for d in (1), I estimated the implicit depreciation rates for 1976-1992. 
Then I used a 3-year moving average of those rates and the series for gross fixed investment 
per industry to accumulate the capital stocks (in the case of extending the series back to 1969, 
this involved solving for Kt in (1)). QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS87   Page 44 
 
FDIKst (Total, T, NT): Total FDI stock per sector, in millions of 1966 colones. FDI stocks 
per industry in 1959 are used as initial values and taken from Thome Loria (1980, chart 3). 
Thereafter, FDI stocks per sector were accumulated using: 
1 1 + + + = t t t FDI FDIK FDIK      (2). 
No depreciation is used to accumulate stocks of FDI, because the FDI figures are 
already net of depreciation. 
 
Ipri (Total, T, NT): Gross fixed private investment per sector, in millions of 1966 colones. 
Ipri is calculated by deducting public fixed investment from total gross fixed investment. The 
BCCR published series of total gross fixed investment per industry until 1996 (figures after 
1996 have not been estimated by the BCCR), but the series for the country total and for public 
fixed investment are up to date. In order to extend the series to 1999, I estimated the shares of 
total gross fixed investment per industry in total gross fixed investment, and used 3 -lag 
moving averages of those shares over total gross fixed investment in 1997-99.  
 
ConPr: Private consumption, in millions of 1966 colones. 
 
Ipub: Gross fixed investment by the consolidated public sector, in millions of 1966 colones. 
 
DCredPr (Total, T, NT): Change in the stock of total bank credit to the private sector, per 
industry, in millions of 1966 colones. 
 
RIntR (Total, T, NT): Real interest rate, estimated as: 
) inf 1 /( ) 1 ( 1 + + + = t t PPI r RIntR          (3) 
where r is the nominal lending interest rate (average lending rates for manufacturing used for 
T; average lending rates for commerce used for NT; simple mean of lending rates for 
manufacturing and commerce used for country total); and PPIinf is the rate of change of the 
producer price index. 
 
Pk/P: Relative price of capital goods, estimated as the ratio of the implicit investment deflator 
to the producer price index. 
 
Pvolat:  Volatility in the producer price index, measured as a 12-month average of the 
coefficient of variation of the producer price index during the previous 36 months 
 
IRERPRO: Internal real exchange rate index, measured as the ratio of the prices of T to the 
prices of NT. The prices of T (NT) are estimated as the geometric weighted average of the 
implicit deflators for all T (NT) industries, where the weights are the current-year shares of 
each industry in total real GDP in T (NT). Implicit price deflators per industry, in turn, are 
calculated by dividing the current-price value added by the constant-price value added, as 
published in the national accounts. 
 
FDI: Gross foreign direct investment inflows, in millions of 1966 colones. 
 
X: Total exports of goods and services, in millions of 1966 colones. 
 
Y*: index of foreign demand, measured by the geometric weighted averages of real GDP 
indices of the nine main trading partners for Costa Rica (US, Japan, Germany, Mexico, 
Venezuela, Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador, Nicaragua). The weights are given by the 
current-year shares of each trading partner’s bilateral trade (exports plus imports) with Costa 
Rica in Costa Rica’s total trade (exports plus imports). Source for real GDP indices of trading 
partners: IMF’s International Financial Statistics. 
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ExtREER: External real effective exchange rate index, defined as a ratio of trade partners’ 
and competing third countries’ consumer price indices to Costa Rica’s consumer price index. 
Source: IMF (series back to 1970 provided to author by Claudio Paiva) 
 
Pm/Pd: Relative prices of imports, defined as the ratio of the import price index to the 
domestic good price index. The latter is calculated  following the procedure described in 
Hinkle and Nsengiyumva (1999), as the ratio of (GDP plus imports of intermediate goods 
minus exports in current prices) to (GDP plus imports of intermediate goods minus exports in 
constant prices).  
 
Gov/Y: Ratio of total government expenditure to GDP, both in current colones.  
 
ImplTariff: Implicit tariffs, defined as the ratio of total tariff revenues to total imports. 
 
OPEN: Openness index, measured as the ratio of (exports plus imports)/GDP, all in current 
colones. 
 
ToT: Index of the internal terms of trade, calculated as the ratio of the export price index to 
the import price index, from national accounts. 
 
GrowthdiffTNT: Sectoral GDP growth differential, measured as GDP growth rate in T 
minus GDP growth rate in NT. 
 
LabprodTNT: Ratio of average labour productivity in T (output per worker) to average 
labour productivity in NT. 
 
NER: Official nominal exchange rate used in national accounts (annual averages). 
 
NKF(exclFDI)/Y: Net capital inflows, excluding FDI/GDP, both measured in current prices. 
 
NRT(exclFDI)/Y: Net resource transfers, excluding FDI (i.e. imports minus exports minus 
FDINRT, as defined below)/GDP, all in current prices. 
 
FDI/Y: FDI inflows/GDP, all in current prices. 
 
FDINRT/Y:  FDI-related net resource  transfers (i.e. FDI inflows minus total FDI 
income)/GDP, all in current prices. 
 
FDIT/Y: FDI flows to T/total GDP, all in 1966 colones. FDIT was deflated using the implicit 
investment deflator. 
 
FDINT/Y:  FDI flows to NT/total GDP, all in 1966 colones. FDINT was deflated using the 
implicit investment deflator. 
 
  
 
 
 
 